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INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, a federal judge in Tennessee sentenced the sixty-one-year-
old Barbara Lang, nicknamed “Aunt Bea,” to 280 years in prison. She 
had no previous criminal record and no known history of violence. Her 
crime? She operated an illegal pill mill where, in return for cash 
payments, physicians prescribed addictive pain killers to patients 
without medical need. Then Aunt Bea clandestinely pocketed much of 
the money in violation of IRS rules. After a three-months-long trial, 
Barbara Lang was convicted of two counts of conspiring to distribute 
and dispense controlled substances, five counts of maintaining a 
premises for the purpose of distributing controlled substances, and 
fourteen counts of structuring financial transactions to evade reporting 
requirements. The judge issued her a prison sentence of nearly three 
centuries, without the possibility of parole. Does a 280-year sentence—
one clearly impossible for anyone to complete—make any sense in the 
first place? Even so, is such a penalty reasonable for a nonviolent, first-
time offender? And what does such an implausibly long sentence in this 
context say about the state of our criminal justice system in America? 
An interesting array of voices have been calling for criminal justice 
reform in recent years. The skyrocketing cost of maintaining prisons 
and the damage done to prisoners, their families, and communities have 
encouraged champions of both liberal and conservative causes to 
advocate for reducing America’s reliance upon lengthy terms of 
imprisonment. So far, changes that have been successfully implemented 
in various jurisdictions (such as pretrial diversion and increased 
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prisoner releases) have slightly reduced the country’s combined prison 
population.1 The likelihood of more substantive reforms and/or 
additional jurisdictions choosing to implement prison reduction 
measures remains questionable in light of both public and political 
attention toward issues outside of criminal justice. Nonetheless, we still 
have much we can learn from current and past practices that have 
played a role in America’s evolution into a country known for its mass 
incarceration headache. 
This Article takes a rather unique approach by reporting on an 
empirical study of what will be referred to herein as extreme sentences, 
such as the one imposed on Aunt Bea. The extreme sentences 
contemplated are unique in that they do not constitute capital 
punishment or represent technical life sentences. Yet they are similar in 
nature by serving as penalties that are meant to result in death in prison. 
The extreme sentences studied herein are defined as those that are at 
least 200 years long, and thus are clearly beyond any person’s natural 
lifespan. The defendants who receive these penalties are part of a group 
that have been nicknamed “virtual lifers,” as the probability they will 
serve the remainder of their lifetimes in prison is near certain.2 
The study herein provides a dataset of extreme sentences issued in 
the federal criminal justice system. A high level purpose of the study was 
to understand which defendants are deemed to deserve them and to 
explore the legal, philosophical, and psychological bases for these 
extraordinary penalties. It undertakes quantitative and qualitative 
explorations of the circumstances underlying the extreme sentences and 
the discourses that report them. This mixed method study includes 
statistical data runs and a discourse analysis. The main sources of data 
are statistical sentencing databases, relevant case opinions, case filings, 
governmental press releases, and news reports. The project can help us 
to piece together at least a part of the puzzle of mass incarceration that 
is, to a significant degree, a product of reliance upon—and the 
normalization of—increasingly lengthier sentences.3 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I contains a literature review 
from legal and psychological disciplines. This background research 
informed certain expectations that the study tested. These expectations 
are offered as informal hypotheses. In sum, it was hypothesized that the 
discourses regarding extreme sentences would: (a) justify them using 
 
 1 Delphine d’Amora, America’s Prison Population is Falling, but Too Slowly to Undo 
Decades of Growth, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 4, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2015/11/americas-prison-population-falling-not-fast-enough. 
 2 Alfred C. Villaume, “Life Without Parole” and “Virtual Life Sentences”: Death Sentences 
by Any Other Name, 8 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 265, 268 (2005). 
 3 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2015: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 3–4 (2016). 
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one or more of the traditional theories of punishment relating to 
deterrence, incapacitation, and/or retributivism; (b) address the 
penalties being proportional to the offense and offender; (c) regard the 
penalties as representing the practical equivalent of life sentences; (d) 
represent an exclusionist mindset to justify banishing from civil society 
the defendants who receive them; (e) engage in dehumanization 
processes; and (f) present problems relating to numerosity, such as 
suggesting cognitive biases referred to as anchoring and scaling effects. 
Part II provides an original contribution to our knowledge about 
severe sentencing practices by focusing on a subset of defendants whose 
prison terms are extreme in that they are at least 200 years in length. 
The federal sentencing system was the chosen jurisdiction because it 
often is seen as a model system, its coverage is nationwide, and the 
federal prison population is the largest in the country. More specifically, 
Part II contains an original dataset identifying federal defendants who 
have received these extreme sentences and the types of crimes they 
committed. Statistical information concerning demographic and case 
characteristics regarding the entire sample are provided. The fact 
scenarios of certain of the more intriguing cases are summarized for 
further context into this unique dataset. In addition, the results of the 
discourse analysis reflect upon the outcomes of the study in terms of the 
hypotheses presented. Conclusions follow. 
I.     PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS FOR EXTREME 
SENTENCES 
A scientific researcher who proposes to study a particular topic 
generally develops certain hypotheses, i.e., expectations or theories, 
about potential outcomes. The topic of interest itself informs the 
researcher in advance about the appropriate investigative inquiries to 
conduct. Based on the focus of this paper on how and why extreme 
prison sentences have come to be issued and normalized, this Part 
explores the applicable axioms that developed from a review of relevant 
legal and psychological literatures. This Part delineates rather casual 
hypotheses about what had been the expected outcomes from 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the dataset of extreme sentences 
and the underlying discourses about them. Philosophical theories 
underlying legal punishments represent an appropriate starting point. 
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A.     Theories of Punishment 
Many expository writings on prison sentences likely reference the 
traditional theories of punishment. This Article will do so as well in 
order to try to explain the existence of extreme penalties in terms of the 
potential theoretical purposes they serve. Still, as these primary 
sentencing philosophies have been discussed at length in other texts, 
rather concise versions are sufficient here. 
The four major theories that underlie American sentencing 
jurisprudence include deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and 
rehabilitation. The latter theory can be ignored here as the dataset of 
sentences of at least two centuries in a system without parole or other 
routine form of periodic review cannot reasonably be argued as 
intended to encourage individual reformation by the prospect of early 
release. 
As for the theory of deterrence, the basic vision is summarily stated 
by the prominent Enlightenment philosopher Cesare Beccaria: “The end 
of punishment . . . is . . . to prevent the criminal from doing further 
injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like 
offence.”4 This statement succinctly conceptualizes corresponding 
perspectives on punishment in terms of deterring the individual 
(specific deterrence) and discouraging others from offending (general 
deterrence). The three key tenets of deterrence theory entail sureness, 
celerity, and severity of the punishment. The likelihood of a penalty 
being imposed is considered the most salient aspect among them in its 
deterrence value.5 Yet the harshness of the punishment remains an 
important aspect, though it must be strictly regulated so as not to cause 
additional harm. As Beccaria noted, “[t]hat a punishment may produce 
the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed 
the good expected from the crime; including in the calculation the 
certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expected 
advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore 
tyrannical.”6 An overly punitive penalty is not only unnecessary, it can 
also be crime-inducing because “[i]f punishments be very severe, men 
are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid the 
punishment due to the first.”7 
 
 4 CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 43 (London, Printed for E. 
Newbery 1785). 
 5 Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 205–06 
(2013). 
 6 BECCARIA, supra note 4, at 99–100. 
 7 Id. at 99. 
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For a potential penalty to achieve its deterring effects in a given 
society, that penalty must be known to its members.8 Thus, an 
additional deterrence value can be derived from the communicative 
function that a formal sanction system begets in educating the citizenry 
about societal values and expected standards of behavior.9 
Deterrence has a utilitarian function, as does the incapacitative 
aspect of certain punishments. Banishment, capital punishment, and 
imprisonment represent responses that serve to directly prevent 
criminals from reoffending against civil society.10 Yet with banishment 
(at least in the form of official expatriation) and the death penalty 
currently disfavored, the steadfast reliance upon prison directly serves 
the incapacitative function of criminal justice in contemporary 
America.11 
Representing a distinctly nonutilitarian sentencing philosophy is 
retributivism. A retributive penalty is based on the notion of “just 
deserts” in that one who violates social norms invites a punitive 
response from the society he offends.12 To be effective in serving the 
ends of civil society, a retributive penalty must be consistent with social 
expectations about what qualifies as an appropriate punishment.13 Thus, 
an appropriately retributive response must be of a kind that is seen as 
sufficiently condemnatory for the crime committed, but at the same 
time not violate moral expectations by being unnecessarily excessive.14 
The salience of these traditional theories of punishment remain as 
philosophical foundations for criminal sentencing in contemporary 
times. Hence, it was hypothesized that explanations by judges who issue 
lengthy prison sentences—particularly those amounting to extreme 
sentences of 200 years or more—and prosecutors and commentators 
discussing these sentences, would draw upon deterrence, incapacitation, 
and/or retributive rationales as justifications. 
 
 8 Id. at 100 (“Men regulate their conduct by the repeated impression of evils they know, 
and not by those with which they are unacquainted.”). 
 9 Norval Morris & Frank Zimring, Deterrence and Corrections, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI., Jan. 1969, at 137, 140 (1969). 
 10 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT 
AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 14–15 (1997). 
 11 Id. 
 12 ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). 
 13 Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to 
Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 910 (2010). 
 14 Id. 
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B.     Proportionality of Penalty 
Each of the three theories of punishment just reviewed involve 
some aspect of the punishment bearing some proportionality to the 
offense and/or offender. Proportionality necessarily entails 
distinguishing between crimes of unequal severity. As Cesare Beccaria 
noted, at least with respect to deterrence theory, “[i]f an equal 
punishment be ordained for two crimes that injure society in different 
degrees, there is nothing to deter men from committing the greater, as 
often as it is attended with greater advantage.”15 The eighteenth century 
English philosopher of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, similarly 
recognized that “where two offences come in competition, the 
punishment for the greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to 
prefer the less.”16 
Bentham also conceptualized that incremental increases in a 
punishment may be justified under certain circumstances. A penalty 
might be supplemented in discrete doses in order to “[p]unish for each 
particular of the mischief.”17 Further, Bentham recognized that the 
penalty should scale for repeat offenders. 
Where the act is conclusively indicative of a habit, such an encrease 
[sic] must be given to the punishment as may enable it to outweigh 
the profit not only of the individual offence, but of such other like 
offences as are likely to have been committed with impunity by the 
same offender.18 
Retributivists likewise believe, considering their just deserts ideology, 
that the quality and quantity of punishment must be tailored to the 
crime(s) committed.19 
Constitutional jurisprudence regarding criminal sentences 
expressly recognizes and promotes deterrence, incapacitation, and 
retributivism, and it also references proportionality prerequisites. The 
constitutional test for analyzing whether a punishment is compatible 
with the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual 
punishment consists of three considerations: (1) the gravity of the 
offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) sentences imposed on other 
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences imposed for 
 
 15 BECCARIA, supra note 4, at 25–26.  
 16 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
36–37 (London, Printed for W. Pickering 1823). 
 17 Id. at 20. 
 18 Id. at 25. 
 19 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 197–98 (Edinburgh, T&T Clark 
1887). 
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committing the same crime in other jurisdictions.20 Importantly, the 
first prong of the test is a qualifying question. Unless the threshold 
contrast between the crime committed and the penalty imposed creates 
an inference of gross disproportionality, the next two prongs of the test 
are rendered superfluous.21 
The Supreme Court has been relatively active in its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence in capital cases and with respect to prison 
sentences for juveniles.22 Yet, its proportionality guidance otherwise has 
floundered. The Court has declined to order that the gross 
disproportionality test requires any strictly proportional tie between the 
severity of the crime and a noncapital sentence.23 Rather, the notion of 
gross disproportionality remains vaguely developed and unrefined.24 
Significantly, the Court has declined in recent times to overrule any 
prison sentence applied to adults, with a single exception.25 A divided 
court in 1983 found unconstitutional a life-without-parole sentence 
under a three-strikes law where the majority viewed the defendant as a 
repeat, but nonviolent, offender.26 This ruling remains an anomaly in 
the Court’s slate of Eighth Amendment decisions involving prison 
sentences. The Court has declined to find as grossly disproportionate 
penalties assigned to adults constituting a life sentence for three 
property offenses,27 a life sentence for a first-time cocaine possessor,28 
twenty-five-years to life as a third-strike penalty where the index offense 
involved the theft of golf clubs valued at $1200,29 and a forty-year prison 
term for marijuana distribution.30 In sum, the Court appears largely 
uninterested in policing prison sentences for adults.31 A critic has rightly 
contended that the principles upon which these cases were decided are 
so subjectively oriented and perplexing that proportionality analysis for 
prison terms now basically exemplifies a judicial “hands-off” policy.32 
 
 20 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983). 
 21 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 22 See Amanda Huston, Comment, Jurisprudence vs. Judicial Practice: Diminishing Miller in 
the Struggle over Juvenile Sentencing, 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 561 (2015). 
 23 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 24 See generally Tom Stacy, Cleaning up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 475 (2005). 
 25 See Michael P. O’Shea, Purposeless Restraints: Fourteenth Amendment Rationality 
Scrutiny and the Constitutional Review of Prison Sentences, 72 TENN. L. REV. 1041 (2005). 
 26 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 27 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264–66 (1980). 
 28 Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957. 
 29 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–21 (2003). 
 30 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–75 (1982). 
 31 See Spearit, Evolving Standards of Domination: Abandoning a Flawed Legal Standard and 
Approaching a New Era in Penal Reform, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 495, 501 (2015). 
 32 Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 527, 530 (2008). 
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Despite the permissive policy from a constitutional perspective 
regarding prison sentences, it is still expected that comments on 
extreme sentences would be concerned with proportionality themes as 
they remain relevant to the traditional theories of punishment. 
Proportionality would also seem an important criterion for penalties 
that are tantamount to life sentences. 
C.     Virtual Life Sentences 
This Article early on briefly referenced the idea of virtual life 
sentences. “Virtual life” is not itself a legally cognizable form of 
sentence, but acts as a descriptor for a genre of penalties. Hence, it may 
be necessary to provide a little more context for where in the scheme of 
sentencing that virtual life sentences might lie. 
In contemporary American criminal justice, the most severe 
sentences available are the death penalty and a life sentence. I posit that 
several forms of life sentences exist. One is the life-without-parole 
(LWOP) version in which the relevant statute provides for a life 
sentence and the particular jurisdiction does not provide a legal avenue 
of parole. Thus, the LWOP prisoner is sent to die in prison unless some 
extraordinary relief somehow becomes available. Another is a “life” 
sentence in name—as in being “sentenced to life”—in a jurisdiction 
offering at least a possibility of parole. Then there is a third variety of life 
sentence. This one occurs in the form of a prison term so long that it 
exceeds the reasonably expected lifespan of the individual sentenced. 
Particularly in jurisdictions without second look review, these lengthy 
prison terms thus represent virtual life sentences, as the possibility of 
release is about as practically improbable as technical life sentences.33 
The distinguishing attributes of a system that uses virtual life terms 
to permanently isolate certain criminals in penal settings are important 
to recognize. Pragmatically, judges who issue virtual life sentences 
presumably intend that they symbolically represent, and in reality result 
in, death in prison.34 Life imprisonment provides figurative value to 
some. As one critic has noted, “[s]ome Americans find solace in the 
adage that there is just one way for [a lifer] to leave prison: in a 
hearse.”35 It is expected, therefore, that judges who issue these sentences, 
 
 33 See Caitlyn Lee Hall, Note, Good Intentions: A National Survey of Life Sentences for 
Nonviolent Offenses, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1101, 1113 (2013). 
 34 See Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall-Smith, Life Without Parole, America’s Other 
Death Penalty: Notes on Life Under Sentence of Death by Incarceration, 88 PRISON J. 328, 344 
n.2 (2008). 
 35 David J. Krajicek, Mass Incarceration: As Legislative Season Ends, Where are the Broad 
Reforms?, TRUTHOUT (June 16, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/
31399-mass-incarceration-the-important-political-issue-of-2016-being-ignored. 
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prosecutors who request them, and commentators who report on them 
will consciously understand that centuries-long penalties are virtual life 
sentences and thereby present as the moral and practical equivalent of 
lifetime penalties. Thus, it is hypothesized that their discourses will 
reflect such an understanding. A related ideology that would appear to 
rather uniquely apply to virtual life sentences is one that embraces an 
exclusionist mentality. 
D.     Exclusionist Mentality 
The American carceral state, to the extent that it condones and 
produces lifetime prison sentences, epitomizes an exclusionist ideology, 
and not a universally reintregationist system.36 By definition, a 
correctional organization whose focus is on reintegrating prisoners 
would foster opportunities to make amends and embrace the humane 
importance of second chances. A lifer, though, is one who, uniquely 
among fellow men, society claims is excludable as he is “irredeemable, 
because one either deserves death in prison or has no hope for change. 
This eternal banishment means that the offender must simply wait to 
die.”37 The official, yet unstated, message to the person seems obvious: 
“It doesn’t matter how much you’ve changed, no matter that you’ve 
aged out of committing crime, no matter how much you’ve tried to 
better yourself. There is no hope for you.”38 In this way, lifers, as 
individuals who are perceived to pose a threat to legal order, are not 
only vilified, the system permanently rescinds their rights to live in 
mainstream society and revokes their moral and political identities.39 
A life sentence may represent the modern equivalent of 
banishment. Centuries ago, Cesare Beccaria noted the societal purpose 
of banishment. “He who disturbs the public tranquility, who does not 
obey the laws, who violates the conditions on which men mutually 
support and defend each other, ought to be excluded from society, that 
is, banished.”40 
In order to help justify extreme sentences entailing hundreds of 
years of prison time, it is therefore expected that discourses about them 
would draw on such an exclusionist mentality. An additional 
 
 36 See Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: 
AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96, 97 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012). 
 37 William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing Life-
Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1054 (2015) 
(footnote omitted). 
 38 Krajicek, supra note 35. 
 39 See Michael M .  O’Hear, The Beginning of the End for Life Without Parole?, 23 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 1, 5 (2010). 
 40 BECCARIA, supra note 4, at 89. 
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psychological ploy may be utilized whereby individuals seen as 
deserving this permanent segregationist treatment are perceived in 
subhuman terms. 
E.     Dehumanization 
Proponents of life sentences may employ various psychological 
constructs underlying dehumanization and infrahumanization 
processes in order to justify perpetually banishing certain criminals 
from civil society. Dehumanization involves “labeling a group as 
inhuman, either by using references to subhuman categories . . . or by 
referring to negatively valued superhuman creatures such as demons, 
monsters, and satans.”41 Dehumanization can be viewed as part of a 
broader cultural engagement in intergroup aggression. When there 
appears to be a conflict of interest between groups, each group might 
seek an excuse to inflict pain on the other.42 Plus, “[t]he more one 
dehumanizes the outgroup, the less they deserve the humane treatment 
enjoined by universal norms.”43 
Infrahumanization is a related concept that concerns denying 
another those attributes which are uniquely human, such as rationality, 
civility, and moral sensibility.44 The two main types of 
infrahumanization are mechanistic dehumanization and animalistic 
dehumanization whereby we perceive certain people or groups as 
machine-like or animal-like, respectively.45 In sum, we may engage in 
dehumanistic and infrahumanistic thought to justify social and moral 
exclusion of individuals now objectified as subhuman.46 
Criminals are a discrete group distinguishable by the significant 
social harms they cause by violating human law. Viewing criminals in 
subhuman terms allows the greater public to rationalize criminals being 
harshly punished, even ill-used, and excludable from moral society.47 By 
dehumanizing criminals, however, we may be masking the extent to 
 
 41 DANIEL BAR-TAL, SHARED BELIEFS IN A SOCIETY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 122 
(2000). 
 42 See Naomi Struch & Shalom H. Schwartz, Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and 
Distinctness from In-Group Bias, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364, 365 (1989). 
 43 Id.  
 44 See Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Cops and Criminals: The Interplay of 
Mechanistic and Animalistic Dehumanization in the Criminal Justice System, in HUMANNESS 
AND DEHUMANIZATION 147, 147 (Paul G. Bain et al. eds., 2014). 
 45 See Milica Vasiljevic & G. Tendayi Viki, Dehumanization, Moral Disengagement, and 
Public Attitudes to Crime and Punishment, in HUMANNESS AND DEHUMANIZATION 129, 131 
(Paul G. Bain et al. eds., 2014). 
 46 See id. at 129–31. 
 47 See id. at 129. 
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which sentences have become exceedingly long and potentially 
disproportionate to the crimes.48 
In terms of infrahumanization, while criminals are at times 
perceived in mechanistic terms, studies indicate that more often animal 
imagery is used.49 For example, a research study found that subjects 
generally resorted to engaging animal-like imagery to describe violent 
criminals, including employing such terms as wild, barbaric, and 
savage.50 The same participants were agreeable to such animalistic 
outcomes for violent offenders as hunting them down, catching, and 
caging them.51 Researchers surveying a group of women found among 
them a common conceptualization of criminals as lacking human 
emotions, such as compassion and feelings, and running in packs like 
wild animals.52 In addition, in a study focused on sex offenders, 
researchers observed that dehumanization processes predicted the 
acceptability of the offenders’ social exclusion, with a stronger effect 
regarding child molesters than rapists.53 
With respect to infrahumanization processes acting as a conduit to 
more punitive sanctions, other studies have shown that a subject’s use of 
animalistic imagery in describing defendants predicted severe 
sentencing outcomes in criminal justice settings.54 
Altogether, these study outcomes, which are supportive of the 
infrahumanization of criminals, suggest another hypothesis to test with 
the research project undertaken herein. One could predict that 
discursive justifications of sentences of such extreme lengths that they 
have the consequence of permanent banishment would include efforts 
to dehumanize the individuals to whom they are given. The next 
psychological construct to parse involves issues with numerosity, or in 
more colloquial parlance, our problem with numbers. 
 
 48 See J. Clark Kelso, Corrections and Sentencing Reform: The Obstacle Posed by 
Dehumanization, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 897, 899 (2014). 
 49 See id. at 900. 
 50 See Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 44, at 156. 
 51 See id. at 152. 
 52 See Esther I. Madriz, Images of Criminals and Victims: A Study of Women’s Fear and 
Social Control, 11 GENDER & SOC’Y 342, 346–47 (1997). 
 53 See G. Tendayi Viki et al., The Role of Dehumanization in Attitudes Toward the Social 
Exclusion and Rehabilitation of Sex Offenders, 42 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2349, 2357 (2012). 
 54 See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292 
(2008); Eduardo A. Vasquez et al., The Animal in You: Animalistic Descriptions of a Violent 
Crime Increase Punishment of Perpetrator, 40 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 337 (2014); Viki et al., supra 
note 53, at 2355. 
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F.     Numerosity 
In the United States, a term of imprisonment is typically 
constructed on some numeric scale (e.g., days, months, or years). It also 
is subject to a statutory maximum, and sometimes a statutory minimum 
time period. Hence, a particular crime might entail a statutorily 
permitted prison term of, perhaps, five to twenty years. Even 
experienced jurists, though, have trouble with translating qualitative 
assessments of culpability and offense severity into quantitative results. 
“Judges, like most people, lack the cognitive capacity to make reliable 
quantitative judgments in a complex environment. They can adopt 
mechanisms to produce a degree of reliability, but their judgments are 
inherently erratic.”55 Psychological mechanisms referred to as anchoring 
and scaling help explain some of the adaptations that judges may engage 
in when determining punitive outcomes that necessarily entail numbers. 
Anchors and scaling are cognitive shortcuts that allow a person, when 
acting in a complex world, to more efficiently reach numerical 
outcomes.56 But, as shall be seen, cognitive shortcuts can lead to 
irrational outcomes. 
1.     Anchoring Effects 
Anchoring is an example of a heuristic shortcut that facilitates 
quicker decision-making.57 Yet anchoring introduces a type of cognitive 
bias. Anchoring effects refer to the tendency for people to rely on 
numeric reference points when making numerically-based judgments.58 
The general idea is that the person’s evaluation may be heavily 
influenced by a given quantity—i.e., the “anchor.”59 
As an example of an anchoring study, researchers directed 
participants to estimate the age at which Mahatma Gandhi died.60 After 
the researchers asked the subjects first whether his death occurred 
 
 55 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted 
Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 701 (2015). 
 56  See Tess M. S. Neal & Thomas Grisso, The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in Forensic 
Mental Health Evaluations, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 200, 205–06 (2014). 
 57 See Bettina von Helversen & Jörg Rieskamp, Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level Crimes: 
Comparing Models of Human Judgment, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: APPLIED. 375, 377 
(2009). 
 58 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 695. 
 59 Silvio Aldrovandi et al., Sentencing, Severity, and Social Norms: A Rank-Based Model of 
Contextual Inﬂuence on Judgments of Crimes and Punishments, 144 ACTA PSCHYOLOGICA 538, 
546 (2013). 
 60 See Yuval Feldman et al., Anchoring Legal Standards, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 298, 
299 (2016). 
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before the age of nine, the subjects generally guessed he had died at 
around age fifty. But when first asked whether Gandhi died before the 
age of 140 years, subjects guessed his death occurred around sixty-seven 
years-of-age.61 
Anchoring effects can ensue from a single numerical reference or 
from a range, as when the person is given both low- and high-value 
anchors.62 The anchoring imprint of prior figures upon numerical 
judgments has been shown to occur across multiple domains of interest, 
such as price appraisals, negotiation outcomes, and jury verdicts.63 
Remarkably, influential effects are observed even when the anchor was 
randomly generated or clearly implausible, such as in the Ghandi 
study.64 Plus, anchoring effects remain relatively stable across research 
participants, that is, without regard to the individual’s level of expertise 
on the particular subject matter.65 
A general rationale for the salience of anchoring is that, in 
evaluating potential numerical values, people may attach significance to 
any piece of information made available to them.66 Researchers have 
cited several psychological explanations for the phenomenon of 
anchoring, albeit with some overlap among them. The first is called 
anchoring and adjustment. A person’s thought process is first oriented 
toward the anchor and then one makes mental adjustments toward a 
final conclusion.67 The initial reliance upon the anchor, though, may 
shortcut mental processing, which may cause the final estimate to be 
overly biased toward the anchor.68 
The second theory of anchoring is at times referred to as social 
implications.69 The idea is that when offered an anchor, we may 
presume that it provides relevant information regarding the item at 
issue.70 Thus, the presentation of the numerical anchor in the first place 
 
 61 See id. at 299. 
 62 See Aldrovandi et al., supra note 59, at 546. 
 63 See Ben R. Newell & David R. Shanks, Prime Numbers: Anchoring and Its Implications for 
Theories of Behavior Priming, 32 SOC. COGNITION 88, 91 (2014). 
 64 See Feldman et al., supra note 60. 
 65 See Ina Grau & Gerd Bohner, Anchoring Revisited: The Role of the Comparative Question, 
PLOS ONE, Jan. 14, 2014. 
 66 See Feldman et al., supra note 60, at 303. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See Daniel Mochon & Shane Frederick, Anchoring in Sequential Judgments, 122 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISIONAL PROCESSES 69, 69 (2013). 
 69 This explanation has alternatively been referred to as conversational inferences. See 
Thomas Mussweiler et al., Anchoring Effect, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON 
FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT, AND MEMORY 183, 190 (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed., 
2004). 
 70 See Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New 
Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 597, 602–03 (2006). 
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implies to the subject that the object’s actual value must be proximate to 
the anchor. 
A third explanation is numeric priming. When a person is given a 
numeric anchor, that number remains more accessible in memory 
because of the person’s initial focus upon it.71 Further, large and small 
anchor values facilitate cognitive connections with larger and smaller 
numbers, respectively, in the person’s final estimates.72 This observation 
helps explain the results of the study in which estimates of Mahatma 
Gandhi’s age at death varied in the same direction towards a lower 
versus a higher age anchor, even though both anchors were implausible 
at face value. 
Finally, anchoring may be a form of magnitude priming. When the 
anchor given is at a certain magnitude on the relevant scale, that 
magnitude provides an influential context. Subjects are then more likely 
to estimate the answer nearer the level suggested by that magnitude.73 It 
may be because the magnitude itself becomes more accessible in one’s 
cognitive process than it might otherwise have been.74 For example, 
study subjects asked to judge the temperature of San Francisco Bay were 
influenced to guess higher when given an otherwise ridiculously high 
anchor of 558 degrees.75 As this last example illustrates, at certain levels, 
anchors can result in a related cognitive bias known as scale distortion. 
2.     Scale Distortion 
When judgments rely upon numbers, people can be influenced not 
only by anchoring; they can also be subject to the effects of scale 
distortion. In assessing the numeric value of an item, part of a person’s 
cognitive process may be drawing upon what appear to be relevant 
comparisons.76 As an example, the sun might be adjudged as shining 
more radiantly when one exits a dark movie theater than if one were to 
exit from a brightly lit supermarket. The sun’s energy might in fact be 
the same in both scenarios, but the person’s recent frame of reference 
differs. A pair of scholars have proposed that such a relative comparison 
modality can also occur when assessing the value of something based on 
 
 71 See id. at 603. 
 72 See Grau & Bohner, supra note 65. 
 73 See Andrew R. Smith & Paul D. Windschitl, Biased Calculations: Numeric Anchors 
Influence Answers to Math Equations, 6 JUDGEMENT & DECISION MAKING 139 (2011). 
 74 See id.  
 75 See Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Anchors Aweigh: A Demonstration of Cross-Modality 
Anchoring and Magnitude Priming, 106 COGNITION 13 (2008). 
 76 See Shane W. Frederick & Daniel Mochon, A Scale Distortion Theory of Anchoring, 141 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GENERAL 124, 124 (2012) (“It is well established that perceptions and 
judgments are affected by the context of preceding or concurrent stimuli.”). 
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some numeric scale.77 The perceived magnitude of a value is not viewed 
in absolute or objective terms, but in comparative terms relative to other 
objects on that scale.78 Yet if the magnitude of the relevant scale is 
shifted, then our judgment can be skewed. For instance, a 400-pound 
lion might appear larger if compared to a 100-pound lion than if 
compared to a 350-pound lion. These reflections suggest that no scale is 
inherently objective and that anchoring effects may alternatively be 
understood in terms of scale distortion.79 
As another example, an anchoring study suggested scale distortion 
when subjects indicated they were more willing to travel twenty minutes 
to another store to save $5 on a $15 item than they were to travel the 
same time to save the same $5 amount but on a $125 item.80 The time 
and savings were identical, so it appears the relevant difference was the 
monetary discount relative to the scaled value of the target item. 
Anchoring effects may in these cases derive from the alteration of the 
scale reference which can distort a person’s cognitive mapping between 
internal representations of values and the numbers used to 
communicate these values.81 In other words, the effect of anchoring may 
also be altered by a shift in the reference scale. 
3.     Anchoring and Scaling in Legal Judgments 
The effects of anchoring and scaling have been shown to apply to a 
variety of legal decisions which depend upon numerically-based 
judgments. Studies indicate that monetary limits to compensation 
awards were positively correlated with higher awards as decision makers 
seemed to be influenced toward the upper limit.82 Other research has 
found that mock judges in sentencing studies are highly influenced by 
anchors suggested by others even when they realized such anchoring 
numbers were generated by random chance.83 
Actual judges, too, may be susceptible when rendering judgments 
dependent on dollars or years. Even though such units may appear to 
 
 77 See id.  
 78 See id.  
 79 See id.  
 80 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 347 (1984). 
 81 See Frederick & Mochon, supra note 76, at 124. 
 82 E.g., Feldman et al., supra note 60, at 304 (citing studies). Similar results have been 
observed for caps on punitive damages. E.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, 
Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
353, 367 (1999). 
 83 E.g., Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant 
Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188, 
191–92 (2005). 
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have objective meaning, a judge’s assessment of the unit’s true value is 
prone to the effects of scale distortions.84 One rationale may be that legal 
decisions which rest upon numbers-based justice still entail subjective 
aspects that are not easily scaled. 
Although the conversion of qualitative to quantitative judgments is 
required in many legal settings, it is a notoriously difficult 
undertaking. Categories do not always map naturally onto 
continuous scales. Errors in human judgment arise from the foibles 
of converting a subjective or qualitative judgment into a linear and 
quantitative scale. These errors can translate into mistaken 
judgments . . . .85 
Thus, we may be attracted to the general idea that there is a correct 
monetary award or time-computed sentence for every civil plaintiff or 
criminal defendant. However, judicial decisions are made in individual 
cases, and the presence of unconscious cognitive biases caused by 
anchoring and scaling suggest that legal error may not necessarily be 
systematically constrained.86 Consider the following ruminations on the 
matter. 
Assume, for example, that a judge has to decide how much months of 
prison sentence she wants to award in a complex case. Before making 
the judgment she is asked whether the sentence should be higher or 
lower than a randomly generated number, a numeric anchor value. 
From a rational point of view, it should not matter whether the 
anchor value is high or low. The judicial judgment should in any case 
not be influenced by such an irrelevant anchor. Regardless, even 
experienced judges’ sentencing decisions are influenced by randomly 
generated numbers, even if the judicial experts determined these 
anchors themselves by throwing dice.87 
As quite relevant to the research herein, further exploratory 
exercises demonstrate that anchor numbers are influential in sentencing 
decisions despite being implausibly extreme or having originated from 
inexperienced sources.88 
Certainly, sentencing recommendations regarding the length of a 
prison term, whether made by the prosecution, defense, or through 
calculations from sentencing guidelines, theoretically represent 
 
 84 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 711. 
 85 Valerie P. Hans et al., Editors’ Introduction to Judgment by the Numbers: Converting 
Qualitative to Quantitative Judgments in Law, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 86 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 700. 
 87 Andreas Glöckner & Birte Englich, When Relevance Matters: Anchoring Effects Can Be 
Larger for Relevant than for Irrelevant Anchors, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 4 (2015) (citing studies). 
 88 For citations to supporting sources, see Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing 
Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 
1541 (2001). 
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numerical anchors that influence sentencing outcomes.89 Research 
confirms that prosecutors’ demands for sentence length in real life tend 
to serve as anchors which influence judges’ decisions.90 This result also 
applies to judges with much experience in deciding criminal 
punishments.91 Additional research likewise indicates a positive 
correlation between the prosecutor’s recommended sentence length and 
the prison term actually issued.92 
When the prosecutor’s suggestion is the anchor, it generally 
represents a high anchor. In a guidelines-based sentencing system (i.e., 
one that yields a numerical range for the length of a purportedly 
reasonable penalty), it is not always clear, though, what will serve as the 
most relevant anchor. It could be that the more important anchor might 
be the floor or the ceiling, or perhaps the middle of that range.93 
Importantly, when proportionality in penalties is a valued goal, an 
intention to punish must somehow be translated onto some type of 
relative value scheme regarding culpability and offense severity. A 
criminal justice system substantially reliant upon imprisonment 
generally involves a temporal scale, such as the number of days, months, 
or years of imprisonment to be imposed.94 Systems of punishment that 
rely heavily on prison terms, consequently, are subject to the influence 
of cognitive bias by scale distortions. A study of judicial sentencing 
confirmed such a bias when the scale itself is replaced. Using the same 
case hypothetical, judges tended to impose shorter sentences when 
required to sentence using a months-based approach than judges who 
used a scale involving years.95 The consequences were drastic. The 
judges who sentenced in months averaged what computes in years to 
about five years; the judges who sentenced in annual increments 
averaged ten years for the same cases.96 
Issues with scale and magnitude might intensify with more severe 
crimes. Researchers suggest that when “the number of months grows 
 
 89 See Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the 
Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 LAW & POL’Y 497, 497 (2006); Nancy 
Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 
137, 138 (2006) (declaring federal guidelines’ recommendations as “ready-made anchors”). 
Guidelines recommendations are lawful anchors throughout the adjudication process. See 
Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 443 (2011). 
 90 E.g., Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 88, at 1541. 
 91 See Aldrovandi et al., supra note 59, at 546; Birte Englich et al., The Last Word in Court: 
A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 716 (2005); Englich & 
Mussweiler, supra note 88, at 1546. 
 92 E.g., Aldrovandi et al., supra note 59, at 546. 
 93 See Isaacs, supra note 89, at 429 n.5. 
 94 See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167 
(2002). 
 95 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 55, at 717. 
 96 Id. at 716. 
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into the hundreds, judges might start to become insensitive to the length 
of the sentence. The difference between 300 and 360 months might not 
seem as notable as the difference between 25 and 30 years.”97 This 
reflection represents a scale distortion as the two ranges in actual time 
are identical. 
Further, when considering proportionality, it is common for the 
decision-maker to weigh a potential penalty in comparison to sentences 
given in other crimes for similar offending.98 Still, issues of scaling 
remain. In a relevant study, researchers found that subjects perceived 
the same sentence as about four times as severe when told it was the 
second longest sentence issued than when informed it was the fifth 
longest.99 
Another issue with numerosity can be briefly mentioned. Two 
studies of actual sentencing decisions indicate that when judges have 
difficulty translating their qualitative sense of desert into numerical 
sentences, they may fixate on certain numbers.100 Tendencies to round 
off numbers have been observed. Judges tended to sentence to the 
nearest whole number, to sentence in even numbers, and to use 
multiples of five and ten.101 It is noted that legal outcomes in which 
qualitative decisions are issued in quantitative, yet rounded, numbers 
may reflect a cognitive scheme that reflects the decision-maker’s gist of 
the case that effectively avoids exactness.102 
4.     Comparative Analysis in Penalty Determinations 
Despite proportionality analysis having no teeth any longer in 
constitutional challenges to prison sentences, the idea of proportionality 
is important to the continuing and significant influence of the main 
theories of criminal punishment. The general tenet that a punishment 
ought to be commensurate to the crime appears straightforward on its 
face. Yet there is no socially agreed-upon standard for setting the 
penalty for any specific offense. Thus, it is not necessarily intuitive in 
any individual case what the reasonable sentence ought to be. Instead, 
 
 97 Id. at 718. 
 98 See Aldrovandi et al., supra note 59, at 543. 
 99 Id. at 538. 
 100 See Craig E. Jones & Micah B. Rankin, Justice as a Rounding Error? Evidence of 
Subconscious Bias in Second-Degree Murder Sentences in Canada, 52 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 110 
(2014); Andrew Wiseman et al., Sentencing and Conventional Number Preferences: A Research 
Note, 8 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 67 (2006). 
 101 See Jones & Rankin, supra note 100, at 118 (citing A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 47 
(John M. Last ed., 3d ed. 1995)). 
 102 See Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to 
Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 134 (2011). 
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we often need some frame of reference, which typically involves making 
relative comparisons from penalties issued for similar offenses.103 
Through such an iterative, comparative process, sentences for similar 
categories of harm then become normalized.104 Consequently, penalties 
issued in other cases can come to represent sources of bias in terms of 
their anchoring and scaling magnitude effects. 
Altogether, this evidence on anchoring effects and scale distortion 
suggests the same cognitive biases may occur with respect to the 
database of extreme sentences offered next. Thus, a relevant hypothesis 
to test is whether there is evidence of any such effects in sentencing data 
and the discourses embodied in the written opinions or oral statements 
by the judges who issue them or the appellate judges who review these 
sentences. 
The next Part presents an empirical study of sentences in the 
federal system. The focus is on sentences of 200 years and more, which 
this Article will continue to refer to as extreme sentences as they 
represent outliers in sentencing practices overall. These extreme 
sentences, and the documentary evidence underlying them, allow a 
mixed method study of the various philosophical and psychological 
constructs just discussed. 
II.     AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF EXTREME SENTENCES 
The criminological study presented herein concerns the federal 
sentencing system. The federal system is an appropriate focus for 
criminal justice research considering that the federal prison population 
is the largest in the country, federal justice policies and practices are 
often considered models for the states, and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission rather uniquely makes available much data about actual 
sentencings.105 In addition, the federal justice system represents judicial 
decision-making across the United States, which means that it thus 
provides a broad geographical coverage. Perhaps the results will, 
therefore, be more generalizable than would a study of a single state’s 
practices. Before providing more details about the study, a quick 
summary of the federal system should suffice to explain the context. 
 
 103 See Aldrovandi et al., supra note 59, at 539; Sunstein et al., supra note 94, at 1170. 
 104 See Sunstein et al., supra note 94, at 1171–72. 
 105 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NATION BEHIND BARS: A HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION (2014); 
Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing’s Wild Ride Continues, 26 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 283, 284–85 (2014). 
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A.     The Federal Sentencing System 
In the federal criminal justice system, judges at the district court 
level are primarily responsible for issuing final sentencing outcomes, 
though guidance is made available. Congress has bestowed upon the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission the authority to promulgate sentencing 
policies and to publish relevant guidelines.106 In general, the guidelines 
provide district judges a method for determining a guidelines-computed 
recommended range for a reasonable prison sentence in each individual 
case. This sentencing recommendation is basically derived from a grid 
with a vertical axis covering what is referred to as the final offense level 
and a horizontal axis with a final criminal history score. The final 
offense level, ranging from one to forty-three (lowest-to-highest), 
represents the severity of the offending conduct overall. The final 
offense total is then combined with a calculated criminal history score, 
itself ranging in ordinal fashion from I to VI (lowest-to-highest).107 For 
each individual case, the sentencing judge selects the appropriate final 
offense level on the vertical axis and the assigned criminal history 
category from the horizontal access, which together determines which 
cell in the grid applies. The applicable cell yields the recommended 
range of months of a prison term.108 To be clear for the purposes of the 
study, the federal guidelines calculate sentences on a scale of months. 
Since 2005, the federal sentencing guidelines have been 
discretionary in nature as a remedy for a constitutional flaw related to 
jury fact-finding.109 District judges may vary from them if they believe a 
more reasonable sentence lies outside the recommended range. 
Nonetheless, sentencing judges are still required by both statute and 
Supreme Court mandate to compute in every case the guidelines’ 
recommended range before issuing a final sentence.110 As a result, the 
recommended range continues to provide relevant, even formalized, 
anchoring numbers. 
 
 106 See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2012). 
 107 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(6) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2014). 
 108 See id. at § 1B1.1(a)(7). 
 109 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 110 See Peugh v. United States, 186 L. Ed. 2d 84, 95 (2013). 
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B.     Methodologies 
The quantitative portion of the study set forth below principally 
includes simple counts and percentages.111 The qualitative component, 
on the other hand, is, at its heart, a discourse analysis. Influenced by the 
work of Michel Foucault, discourse theory derives substance from 
interdisciplinary principles that highlight the societal importance of 
discourse: “Discourse is constitutive of social relations in that all 
knowledge, all talk, all argument takes place within a discursive context 
through which experience comes to have, not only meaning for its 
participants, but shared and communicable meaning within social 
relations.”112 Discourse functionally and instrumentally uses language as 
social practice.113 
As a research methodology, discourse analysis permits an 
exploration of the interplay between texts, discursive practices, and the 
larger social context that bears upon the text and the discursive 
practices.114 Discourse analysis within the field of law, specifically, is 
appropriate and meaningful. In the practice of law, we strategically use 
language in individual cases which simultaneously influences power 
balances between individuals and groups.115 The results of the discourse 
analysis conducted herein will follow the introduction of the dataset. 
C.     The Dataset 
This study provides an original dataset of all federal defendants 
who were sentenced to at least 200 years in prison over the last sixteen 
years (more specifically, the study period range includes the years 2000–
2015). The dataset and the additional information underlying the 
quantitative and qualitative analyses running through this Part II were 
compiled through triangulating a host of public information 
repositories. Sources for the data primarily consist of case opinions, 
court filings, press releases, news reports, and statistical databases made 
available from the U.S. Sentencing Commission. To the extent possible, 
 
 111 The author has elsewhere conducted a more sophisticated logistic regression analysis of 
federal sentences of 470 months (about forty years) and higher. See Melissa Hamilton, Some 
Facts about Life: The Law, Theory, and Practice of Life Sentences, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
 112 Trevor Purvis & Alan Hunt, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, 
Ideology . . . , 44 BRITISH J. SOC. 473, 492 (1993). 
 113 See generally LINDA A. WOOD & ROLF O. KROGER, DOING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: 
METHODS FOR STUDYING ACTION IN TALK AND TEXT (2000). 
 114 See generally NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH, LANGUAGE AND POWER (2d ed. 2001). 
 115 See Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the 
Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 80910 (1987). 
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information was cross-verified against the other collected source 
materials. 
Table 1 contains the name of each defendant, his/her sentence in 
both months and years, the federal district in which the defendant was 
sentenced, the fiscal year of sentencing,116 the listed prison release date 
(unless the defendant as of the time of this writing was incarcerated in a 
state prison or deceased), and the general offense category. Overall, a 
total of fifty-five defendants received sentences of at least 200 years in 
the federal system since 2000. 
  
 
 116 The U.S. Sentencing Commission uses fiscal years that begin October 1. 
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Table 1. Extreme Sentences in the Federal System 
 
Defendant 
Sentence 
in Months 
Sentence in 
Years District 
Fiscal 
Year Release Date Offense Type 
Patricia Allana Ayers 19,080   1590 Ala. N. 2015 Statea Child 
pornography 
Pierre Ernest Falgout 11,520    960 Ala. N. 2008 Lifeb Child 
pornography 
Sholam Weiss 10,140    845 Fla. M. 2000 11/23/2754 Fraud 
Matthew David Ayers 9,000    750 Ala. N. 2015 Statea Child 
pornography 
Bruce Warren Betcher 9,000    750 Minn. 2007 Deceased Child 
pornography 
Jordan David Huff 8,955    746.25 Cal. E. 2010 Statea Armed 
robberies 
Marcus Major 8,941    745.08 Cal. E. 2010 10/2/2654 Armed 
robberies 
Keith Pound 8,880    740 Fla. M. 2000 Deceased Fraud 
Stephen M. Howells II 6,960    580 NY N. 2016 2/14/2521 Child 
pornography 
James Shawn Hulsey 5,760    480 Ala. N. 2009 7/2/2428 Child 
pornography 
Christine Staggs McKim 5,400    450 Ala. N. 2009 11/9/2398 Child 
pornography 
Darry Wayne Hanna 5,280    440 SC 2007 9/13/2389 Fraud 
Lonny J. Andrews 4,860    405 Ky. E. 2003 Deceased Child 
pornography 
Timothy James Poole 4,800    400 SC 2010 10/27/2357 Fraud 
Jason Montes 4,705    392.08 Tex. N. 2008 7/21/2348 Bank 
robberies 
Margarito Armijo 4,692    391 Tex. N. 2008 5/15/2348 Bank 
robberies 
Curtis Solomon 4,641    386.75 Fla. S. 2009 3/24/2345 Armed 
robberies  
Andrew Jay McGrath 4,440    370 Ind. S. 2010 1/18/2332 Child 
pornography 
Tony Hewitt 4,260    355 Tex. N. 2010 2/17/2274 Bank 
robberies 
Corey Deyon Duffey 4,253    354.42 Tex. N. 2010 1/26/2274 Bank 
robberies 
Jarvis Ross 3,960    330 Tex. N. 2010 4/1/2257 Bank 
robberies 
Norman Schmidt 3,960    330 Colo. 2008 Deceased Fraud 
Gary Steven Vasiloff 3,900    325 Ala. N. 2008 9/27/2290 Child 
pornography 
William Dunn 3,900    325 Tenn. M. 2009 12/13/2289 Drugs 
William A. King 3,781    315.08 Md. 2006 9/25/2276 Armed 
robberies 
David Ryan Bostic 3,780    315 Ind. S. 2012 5/4/2285 Child 
pornography 
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Defendant 
Sentence 
in Months 
Sentence in 
Years District 
Fiscal 
Year Release Date Offense Type 
Myles W. Robinson 3,771    314.25 La. W. 2014 5/25/2286 Armed 
robberies 
(N/A) 117 3,720    310 Ala. N. 2007 --- Child 
pornography 
Robert Thompson 3,708    309 La. M. 2010 2/14/2278 Fraud  
Nicole F. Vaisey 3,600    300 NY N. 2016 4/24/2277 Child 
pornography 
Roderick McNeal 3,484    290.33 Tenn. W. 2009 6/13/2260 Armed 
robberies 
Leland Beasley 3,480    290 Mo. E. 2011 Statea Child 
pornography 
Barbara Lang 3,360    280 Tenn. E. 2015 8/25/2257 Drugs 
Dumonde Wiley 3,184    265.33 Ky. W. 2004 8/7/2235 Armed 
robberies 
Sidney Fletcher 3,184    265.33 Ky. W. 2004 12/20/2235 Armed 
robberies 
Felix A. Okafor 3,157    263.08 NC E. 2014 3/23/2241 Drugs 
Philip Andra Grigsby 3,120    260 Kan. 2013 1/20/2239 Child 
pornography 
James Phillip Edwards 2,940    245 Mo. W. 2013 3/24/2223 Child 
pornography 
Jamail James Hogan 2,904    242 Fl. M. 2006 7/14/2080b Armed 
robberies 
James Napier 2,880    240 Ohio S. 2014 2/20/2222 Child 
pornography 
Maurice Gibson 2,880    240 WV S. 2014 12/3/2214 Drugs 
Daniel T. Eckstrom 2,880    240 Ind. N. 2015 6/25/2222 Child 
pornography 
Jason Wiley 2,847    237.25 Nev. 2012 6/7/2217 Armed 
robberies 
David Metzger 2,820    235 Ind. S. 2010 8/14/2214 Child 
pornography 
Larue Yusef Smith 2,790    232.5 Penn. E. 2009 2/15/2220 Armed 
robberies 
Andre Lavon Jones 2,724    227 Mich. E. 2009 Statea Bank 
robberies 
Kendricus M. Williams 2,719    226.58 NC E. 2009 9/19/2205 Armed 
robberies 
Jeremiah Travis III 2,672    222.67 Ga. N. 2008 8/9/2200 Armed 
robberies 
Leonard Earl Roulhac 2,654    221.17 Va. E. 2010 10/17/2207 Bank 
robberies 
Tony Orlando Hughes 2,616    218 Va. E. 2005 2/6/2198 Drugs 
Gary Eugene Chapman 2,580    215 Tenn. M. 2012 4/10/2198 Gang 
shootings 
 
 117 This defendant was unidentifiable by name. 
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Defendant 
Sentence 
in Months 
Sentence in 
Years District 
Fiscal 
Year Release Date Offense Type 
Michael Joseph Pepe 2,520    210 Cal. C. 2014 5/27/2189 Child sex 
travel 
Matthew C. Graziotti 2,520    210 Fla. M. 2015 6/25/2197 Child 
pornography 
Salvador Magluta 2,460    205 Fla. S. 2003 6/11/2170 Drugs 
Steven Lorenzo 2,400    200 Fla. M. 2006 1/23/2179 Drugs 
Notes: a = Incarcerated in a state prison; b = Incarcerated in federal prison and release date 
listed questionable.118 
 
The release date (if any) listed on the Bureau of Prisons’ website 
was included as a column to illustrate that these penalties serve, both 
theoretically and practically, as virtual life sentences. With good time 
capped at 15% and with federal parole having been abolished by the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,119 it is clear that none of these 
defendants will be released in their lifetimes—bar some unforeseen 
event. 
The next subsections contain additional data about the set of 
extreme sentence defendants, such as providing quantitative and 
qualitative information on selected demographic and case 
characteristics. Descriptions of some of the more interesting and tragic 
cases are then provided. At various times, the discussion will consider 
whether these extraordinary punishments are proportional to the crimes 
in all cases and whether these defendants generally represent the worst 
of the worst offenders for which these penalties ought to be reserved. 
1.     Demographic Data 
Certain demographic data was discoverable for almost all of the 
defendants from reliable sources, and revalidated with other sources 
whenever possible. In terms of gender, all but four of the defendants 
were male. It might be of particular interest what types of offenses the 
women committed. Three of them share common storylines. These 
three women were convicted of child pornography production and each 
was sentenced along with her male husband or boyfriend for the same 
 
 118 This is likely either a typographical error on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ website or, in 
the case of Falgout, the defendant was sentenced to LWOP for additional crimes. Pierre Ernest 
Falgout’s sentence of 960 years was confirmed in 2013. Falgout v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97491 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2013). Jamail James Hogan’s sentence of 242 years was 
affirmed in 2013. United States v. Hogan, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180106 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 24, 
2013). 
 119 Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–300, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2040 (1984) (codified as amended 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3551–3742 (2012); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2012)). 
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offenses. Patricia Ayers, given the single longest sentence—at 1590 
years—was convicted along with her husband of crimes related to 
videotaping their own sexual molestation of a minor child age six who 
had been in their care.120 Ayers’ husband received a far lesser, but still 
extreme, sentence of 750 years. It is notable that despite the 
extraordinary length of their federal sentences, the Ayers were also 
prosecuted in state court on sodomy and child pornography production 
charges, they pled guilty, and both were sentenced to life sentences at 
the state level.121 
Nicole Vaisey and her boyfriend, Stephen M. Howells II, were 
similarly both convicted in the federal system for multiple child 
pornography production charges and sentenced to 300- and 580-year 
terms, respectively. The prosecutions followed their kidnapping of two 
young Amish girls from a roadside farm stand. The pair took the girls to 
the defendants’ home where, over the course of about twenty-four 
hours, they drugged the girls, sexually molested them, and videotaped 
the crimes. They released the girls in a secluded area thereafter, allegedly 
because they had not yet completed soundproofing a room that would 
have allowed them to keep the girls longer without risking that the 
neighbors could hear screams.122 The extreme federal sentences followed 
the pair’s conviction for the sexual abuse at the state level, where they 
each received twenty-five-year sentences.123 
James Shawn Hulsey and Christine Staggs McKim were a couple in 
this dataset also both convicted of child pornography production, which 
entailed sexually molesting their own two babies and taping the abuse.124 
A difference for this couple is that it does not appear that a state also 
convicted and sentenced them separately. The fourth woman in the 
dataset, Barbara Lang, has a completely different story from the other 
women. Introduced at the beginning of this paper, “Aunt Bea,” 
presumably so nicknamed because of her age (sixty-one) and stocky 
 
 120 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., Florence Couple 
Sentenced to Hundreds of Years in Prison for Producing Child Pornography (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/birmingham/press-releases/2014/florence-couple-sentenced-to-hundreds-
of-years-in-prison-for-producing-child-pornography. 
 121 See Shoals Couple Sentenced on Child Sex Abuse Charges, WAFF 48 (Feb. 26, 2015, 7:04 
AM), http://www.waff.com/story/27970064/shoals-couple-sentenced-on-child-sex-abuse-
charges. 
 122 See Judge Imposes Lifetime Prison Terms in Amish Kidnapping Case, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 
2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-imposes-lifetime-prison-terms-
amish-kidnapping-case-n482161. 
 123 See Sicko Couple Who Sexually Abused Amish Girls Get Centuries Behind Bars, N.Y. POST 
(Dec. 17, 2015, 5:09 PM), http://nypost.com/2015/12/17/sicko-couple-who-sexually-abused-
amish-girls-get-hundreds-of-years-behind-bars. 
 124 See Jason Morton, Child Abuser Gets 480 Years, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Dec. 10, 2008, 3:30 
AM) [hereinafter Morton, Child Abuser Gets 480 Years], http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/
article/20081210/NEWS/812090193. 
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appearance, operated a pill mill in Tennessee. The operation entailed a 
medical clinic out of which doctors improperly prescribed addictive 
pain killers to scores of drug abusers. Lang was also convicted on federal 
charges of illegally structuring financial transactions to shield the profits 
from authorities.125 This is the first case to be introduced that raises the 
question of proportionality in sentencing. Lang had no criminal history 
and there were no allegations of her prescribing or directly distributing 
drugs to patients. There is also no evidence of Lang ever having 
committed violent acts in connection with the pill mill or otherwise.126 
In any event, for now, additional information on other demographic 
characteristics of the dataset will be summarily provided.  
Racial discrimination in criminal justice is a common topic of 
interest, but it was not a focus of this study. Still, it should be noted that 
racial disproportionality (considering the current racial makeup of the 
country) was observed. Just over half (twenty-nine out of fifty-five) of 
the defendants were white. Of the twenty-six defendants who were 
minority, the vast majority (twenty-three) were black, while the 
remaining three were Hispanic. There existed clear racial divisions in 
terms of the type of crimes committed. White defendants accounted for 
almost all of the child pornography and fraud offenders in the dataset. 
Minority defendants accounted for the vast majority of the armed 
robberies (including bank heists) and drug offenses. 
The age range for the group was twenty-one to seventy-two years-
of-age, with a mean age of thirty-eight. Age-based differences in terms 
of the crimes were also evident. Defendants who were aged forty-years 
and older tended to have been convicted of child pornography or 
financial fraud. The younger ones were more likely to have been armed 
robbers or bank robbers. The age range for the drug offenders was more 
varied. Overall, the group was relatively well-educated. While there were 
missing data in two cases, the general picture was that roughly eight out 
of ten of those with known educational backgrounds had at least a high 
school diploma, with half of that number having at least some college 
credits. Seven of the defendants (13%) were college graduates; they 
tended to be child pornography producers. 
 
 125 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Tenn., Chattanooga Pill Mill 
Operator Sentenced to 280 Years in Prison (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtn/
pr/chattanooga-pill-mill-operator-sentenced-280-years-prison. 
 126 The author gathered this information from the absence in the reports and governmental 
press releases of any mention of any other illegal activity, and statements made by the 
prosecutor about seeking the sentence because of her pill mill operations. 
HAMILTON.38.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  4:44 PM 
2016] E X T R E M E  P RI S O N  S E N T E N C E S  87 
 
2.     Case Characteristics 
The cases in this extreme sentence dataset generally fell within the 
offense categories of child pornography production, armed robberies, 
bank robberies, financial fraud, and drug distribution. It might be a 
surprise that just over half of the defendants receiving these extreme 
sentences were assigned the minimum criminal history score (Criminal 
History category I per the guidelines’ structure). Less than a quarter 
ranked at the top end of the criminal history score (Criminal History 
categories V and VI). Thus, many of these prisoners facing virtual life in 
prison were not known to be recidivists. Only a minority of them 
appeared to be career offenders. The final offense levels (on a scale of 1 
to 43) ranged from 21 to 43, with a mean of 38. Just over half of the 
defendants were at the maximum 43 levels, with most of them being the 
child pornography defendants. In other words, most of the defendants 
receiving extreme sentences were not adjudged the absolute worst of 
offenders on either the criminal history or the offense severity scales as 
computed by the Sentencing Commission’s guidelines. Yet these 
defendants still received the longest sentences in the system. 
The federal criminal justice system is heavily reliant upon efficient 
case processing through pleas. Typically, about 97% of all federal 
defendants plead guilty.127 The extreme sentence group is 
distinguishable in this regard. During the study period, approximately 
40% of the extreme sentencing group pled guilty, meaning that 60% 
went to trial. It could be that so many of them chose to go to trial 
because, as related further below, each of them faced multiple charges 
and thus risked consecutive sentencing. 
A noticeable geographic disparity existed. A significant majority of 
the extreme sentencing defendants were in southern states. More 
specifically, most of them were sentenced in the southeastern part of the 
country. The Northern District of Alabama counted the greatest 
number of extreme sentences at seven defendants, followed by the 
Northern District of Texas128 and the Middle District of Florida each 
with five defendants. All of the Northern District of Alabama cases were 
for child pornography. All of the Northern District of Texas cases 
involved bank robberies. In contrast, the Middle District of Florida’s 
cases represented a variety of offenses. It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to be able to adequately explain these regional deviations other 
 
 127 E.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 
2015, at 42 (2016). 
 128 The Northern District of Texas is otherwise known for its extraordinary sentencing 
practices. In separate data analyses, this district has the highest rate of upward departures for 
combined fiscal years 2008–2015. 
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than to note that it might represent geographic and offense-based 
disparities in sentencing. 
Unexpectedly, almost two-thirds of the extreme sentence 
defendants had codefendants. Indeed, more than a few of the 
codefendants are within this dataset, meaning that they received 
extreme sentences by the same courts for their shared offending. 
Previously mentioned were the three male-female couples jointly 
convicted of child pornography offenses, and all six of those individuals 
received sentences of at least 200 years. Several other groups were armed 
robbers or bank robbers.129 Among these were Tony Hewitt, Corey 
Duffy, and Jarvis Ross, who committed multiple armed bank robberies 
together. Their three sentences were correspondingly bunched together 
in the 330- to 355-year range. Jordan Huff and Marcus Major were 
codefendants convicted of armed robberies and gang involvement and 
their sentences were both at just under 750 years each. Another couple 
of codefendants in this dataset, Keith Pound and Shalom Weiss, 
committed financial fraud together and they received the longest federal 
sentences for white-collar crime at 740 and 845 years, respectively. 
While not a focus of the study, an implication of the frequent 
presence of co-offenders in a set of extreme sentences could be linked to 
the rationale that underlies a criminal justice policy of adding 
punishment when criminals conspire with others to commit crimes. The 
idea is that a criminal may be considered a greater threat to others when 
he acts in concert with another. 
3.     Selected Case Studies 
The facts of at least a few of the cases stood out, not just in terms of 
the extraordinary sentences imposed, but for idiosyncratic reasons. 
Further facts on several of these are summarized here in order to further 
contextualize this outlier set of defendants. For example, Michael Joseph 
Pepe was not a typical sex offender. Pepe, a former Marine, traveled to 
Asia with the intent to have sexual contact with Cambodian girls.130 A 
local prostitute acted as his broker. Pepe paid her a finder’s fee and 
compensated the families for access to the girls, who were aged nine to 
 
 129 Dumonde Wiley and Sidney Fletcher were codefendants convicted of armed robberies 
and sentenced to the same penalties exceeding 200 years. See United States v. Wiley, 132 F. 
App’x 635 (6th Cir. 2005). Jason Montes and Margarito Armijo committed bank robberies 
together and each was sentenced to just over 390 years. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the N. Dist. of Tex., Federal Jury Convicts Two Bank Robbers (Apr. 15, 2008), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/usao/txn/PressRel08/montes_armijo_bank_rob_conv_pr.html.  
 130 See Victoria Kim, Man Gets 210 Years in Overseas Molestations, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/28/local/la-me-0301-sex-tourism-sentencing-
20140301. 
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thirteen.131 After Pepe was arrested, prosecutors flew six of the girls he 
abused into the United States to testify, with the help of a translator, 
against him.132 This case is distinguishable from most criminal justice 
prosecutions in representing the United States’ interests at times in 
pursuing crimes occurring outside its geographic boundaries. 
Several cases involved stereotypical visions of the combination of 
drug trafficking and violence within the federal war on drugs. Maurice 
Taft “Mo” Gibson133 was sentenced for running a drug ring and 
ordering the murder of a drug dealer whom he learned was cooperating 
with a police investigation into Gibson’s drug operation.134 Gibson was 
reported to have flaunted his riches by wearing Rolex watches and mink 
coats, driving Cadillac Escalades, and acquiring multiple homes and 
other real estate.135 Felix A. Okafor perhaps also presents what is 
envisioned as the common criminal in federal sentencing in terms of his 
crimes. Okafor is a Nigerian national convicted of multiple charges 
related to the distribution of marijuana and heroin, gun charges, and 
money laundering.136 Neighbors had become suspicious after Okafor 
purchased a neighborhood convenience store. Okafor only halfheartedly 
operated it, keeping it sparsely stocked. Yet strangers arriving in 
expensive cars would enter the store at all hours. Eventually, undercover 
agents made drug purchases at the store and thereafter made the 
arrest.137 
Salvador Magluta’s life could have been a movie. A reporter 
thought so, referring to Magluta as mimicking the movie figure Scarface 
in being a Cuban-born drug kingpin similar to the part that Al Pacino 
played in the movie of the same title.138 In the 1980s, Magluta was 
 
 131 See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Ex-Marine Receives 210-Year Federal Prison 
Term for Drugging and Raping Girls in Cambodia (Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., Ex-marine Receives 210-Year Prison Term], https://www.ice.gov/news/
releases/ex-marine-receives-210-year-federal-prison-term-drugging-and-raping-girls-
cambodia.  
 132 Scott Glover, Abused Girls Testify in U.S., L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/26/local/me-kids26. 
 133 Justin Fenton & Madison Park, Trial Tactic Decried: Murder Accusation May Figure in 
Dealer’s Term, BALT. SUN (May 16, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-05-16/news/
0805150357_1_sentencing. 
 134 See Tammie Toler, Former Drug Kingpin Sentenced to 2 Centuries, BLUEFIELD DAILY 
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.bdtonline.com/archives/former-drug-kingpin-
sentenced-to-centuries/article_d9313f1d-fafc-53ac-b771-e01743c1bc8b.html. 
 135 See id. 
 136 See Nigerian Man Sentenced to 263 Years in U.S. Prison for Drug Dealing/Money 
Laundering, BELLA NAIJA (Dec. 7, 2014, 10:48 PM), https://www.bellanaija.com/2014/07/
nigerian-man-sentenced-to-263-years-in-u-s-prison-for-drug-dealingmoney-laundering. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Marcus Warren, 205 Years for ‘Scarface,’ TELEGRAPH (Jan. 25, 2003, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1420054/205-years-for-
Scarface.html. 
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considered a cocaine cowboy, running one of the largest cocaine 
importation operations in the world at the time.139 Operating out of 
Miami, Florida, Magluta and his crew would smuggle into the country 
by speedboat large shipments of cocaine obtained from Colombian drug 
cartels. Monies from the illicit drug operations were then laundered 
through various businesses and real estate purchases. Magluta and his 
colleagues enjoyed the high life in public view. They were considered 
untouchable.140 It turned out that they were not entirely immune. 
Prosecutors tried Magluta in 1996 for drug offenses. Jurors found the 
defendant innocent. Yet the circumstances were curious. Several 
witnesses turned up dead, the juror foreperson appeared to have 
suddenly become rich, and a prosecutor resigned after a strange incident 
in a strip club.141 It was also discovered that Magluta used part of the 
laundered money to pay his defense lawyers.142 Nonetheless, prosecutors 
eventually brought new charges. After another lengthy trial in 2002, 
Salvador Magluta was found guilty on about one-fourth of the charges 
brought regarding money laundering and the bribery of witnesses and 
jury members in connection with the first trial.143 The judge sentenced 
the kingpin to 205 years in prison. The odd tale did not end there. When 
his co-defendant handed over to prosecutors the cash that he had agreed 
to forfeit, prosecutors discovered that several of the bills were 
counterfeit and some of it missing.144 
The dataset also includes a corrupt drug cop who could easily have 
fit in with any storyline on the popular HBO television series The Wire. 
The show revolved around the tragedies of the drug war on the streets of 
Baltimore, Maryland. William A. King was an actual Baltimore police 
detective. He used his position to stop known drug users and then 
threaten them with arrest unless they gave up their drugs and cash.145 
King claimed that he was merely pursuing a proper police investigation 
by developing sources and using the money to pay informants. 
Authorities began investigating King and his partner after they were 
identified by name as being corrupt cops in a video called “Stop 
Snitchin” that warned drug users not to cooperate with police.146 
 
 139 See Jim Defede, Falcon and Magluta, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Feb. 12, 1992, 4:00 AM), http://
www.miaminewtimes.com/news/falcon-and-magluta-6364835. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See Warren, supra note 138. 
 142 See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 143 See Magluta v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153182 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2011). 
 144 See Ann W. O’Neill, Trafficker Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison: Counterfeit Notes Found 
in Forfeited Cash, SUN SENTINEL (July 23, 2003), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2003-07-23/
news/0307230085_1_falcon-cocaine-sentencing. 
 145 See United States v. King, 270 F. App’x 261, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 146 See Drug Cases in Jeopardy After Feds Indict Officers, WBAL-TV (May 13, 2005, 5:34 
AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/Drug-Cases-In-Jeopardy-After-Feds-Indict-Officers/8890268. 
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The individual whose sentence is at the lowest end for this dataset, 
i.e., at 200 years, was also convicted of drug distribution charges and 
found to have committed violent acts, though his story is quite different. 
Steven Lorenzo met men in bars, slipped a date rape drug into their 
drinks, took them home, and then bound and tortured them during 
sexual escapades.147 Additional evidence indicated that Lorenzo and a 
colleague jointly raped two of the men, murdered them, dismembered 
their bodies, and disposed of the remains.148 
Some of the defendants with extreme sentences were property 
offenders. One of the white-collar defendants became notorious for the 
sheer size of the fraud he committed, as well as having escaped during 
his trial. Sholam Weiss was convicted on various charges related to 
racketeering, money laundering, and fraud in connection with the 
failure of a company he co-owned named the National Heritage Life 
Insurance Company.149 While the jury was deliberating during his 
criminal trial, Weiss fled the country.150 The district judge sentenced 
him to 845 years in absentia.151 Weiss’ attorney had argued at the time 
that his crime was about “money, not murder” and that “[h]is weapon 
was a pen, which is not dangerous.”152 Presumably, the attorney would 
think the resulting sentence disproportionate for a non-violent, white-
collar case. Weiss was eventually found in Austria and extradited back 
to the United States. During his year as a fugitive, Weiss spent time in 
South America, Europe, and Israel in the company of his much younger 
Brazilian girlfriend, allegedly using for living expenses some of the cash 
he had stolen by looting the insurance company.153 Weiss was later 
featured on an episode of a television documentary called American 
Greed, where he was called a “bold and brazen dealmaker” and “a 
consultant to con men and the brains behind one of the largest scams in 
history.”154 
Thus far, the population of extreme sentence defendants has been 
presented, along with information about their demographic and case 
facts. Additional descriptions about certain of the more intriguing 
 
 147 See Man Sentenced to 200 Years for Drugging, Raping Men, FREE REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2006, 
4:03 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1566995/posts. 
 148 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., Tampa Man Convicted for Drug Facilitated 
Crimes of Violence (Nov. 10, 2005), https://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/newsrel/mia111005.html. 
 149 See Weiss v. Yates, 2008 WL 5235162, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 150 See Weiss v. Yates, 375 F. App’x 915, 916 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 151 See Yates, 2008 WL 5235162, at *2. 
 152 Susan Clary, Insurance Crooks to Serve Life–Plus, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Feb. 16, 2000), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2000-02-16/news/0002150484_1_fawsett-weiss-heritage-
life-insurance. 
 153 See William K. Rashbaum, Fugitive Arrested in Austria after a Year on the Run, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/26/nyregion/fugitive-arrested-in-
austria-after-a-year-on-the-run.html. 
 154 American Greed: Sholam Weiss (CNBC television broadcast Mar. 24, 2010). 
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subjects provided a bit more context. The discourse analysis presented 
next will answer whether the hypotheses that drove its undertaking were 
supported. 
D.     Rationales for Extreme Sentences 
The discourses by judges, litigants, and media professionals 
regarding the 200-year-plus prison terms provide quantitative and 
qualitative insights into the justifications given, and those understood, 
for these outlier, extreme sentences. The discourses were obtained from 
the various source materials previously mentioned, such as case 
opinions, governmental press releases, and news reporting. Some of the 
justifications are more practical in terms of compliance with statutory 
mandates, while others are more philosophical and judgmental. 
1.     Statutory Explanations 
In approaching this study, the idea was to test certain philosophical 
and psychological constructs that would be relevant to extreme 
sentences. The interest was not statutory in nature. Nonetheless, an 
exploratory analysis of the materials revealed clear statutory drivers that 
should be mentioned. The pivotal statutory basis that permitted the 
extreme sentences was the imposition of consecutive sentencing for 
multiple counts of conviction. Notably, consecutive sentencing in these 
cases was in contrast to the typical practice of concurrent penalties in 
cases of more than one charge. These defendants were convicted of 
between seven and eighty-one counts, with a mean of twenty-six. The 
presence of more than a few conviction offenses makes this set of 
defendants unique at the outset. A separate statistical analysis of the 
Sentencing Commission’s datasets from fiscal years 1999 to 2015 
indicates that 83% of all cases involved a single count of conviction, and 
another 11% entailed two counts. At the other extreme, only 2% of cases 
during that time frame involved at least five counts of conviction. 
Resorting to the option of stacking sentences on multiple counts of 
conviction is not necessarily impermissible, but is uncommon in federal 
sentencing overall. By statute, when multiple terms of imprisonment are 
imposed on an individual defendant at the same time, such terms are 
assumed to run concurrently unless the court expressly orders otherwise 
or a statute specifically mandates the terms to run consecutively.155 The 
 
 155 See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2012). 
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Sentencing Commission provides a general rationale for the 
presumption that multiple terms presumably are to run concurrently. 
Usually, at least one of the counts will have a statutory maximum 
adequate to permit imposition of the total punishment as the 
sentence on that count. The sentence on each of the other counts will 
then be set at the lesser of the total punishment and the applicable 
statutory maximum, and be made to run concurrently with all or part 
of the longest sentence.156 
Hence, outside of statutory mandates to the contrary, consecutive 
sentencing is only appropriate if the judge determines that no count will 
carry an adequate statutory maximum for the full punishment deemed 
necessary to achieve a reasonable sentence.157 
Thus, all of the extreme sentences in this dataset were generated by 
the accumulation of multi-year prison terms across numerous counts of 
conviction. In some cases, the math was quite simple. For example, in 
United States v. Poole, the sentence of 400 years consisted of the 
statutory maximum of twenty years on each of twenty counts to be 
served consecutively (20 x 20 years = 400 years).158 In United States v. 
Lorenzo, the judge sentenced the defendant to the statutory maximum 
of twenty years on each of ten charges, to be served consecutively, to 
achieve the total 200-year sentence (10 x 20 years = 200 years).159 
Similarly, in another case the sentence of 440 years was attained for 
consecutive sentences of twenty years each for one count of conspiracy 
to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, nineteen counts of mail fraud, and 
two counts of wire fraud (22 x 20 years = 440 years).160 
For other defendants, the accumulation of sentences on multiple 
counts was a little more complicated. For example, in United States v. 
Betcher, the court sentenced the defendant to 750 years, which was the 
cumulative maximum on twenty-six counts.161 The Betcher sentence 
included twenty-four counts of child pornography production at a 
statutory maximum of thirty years each, one count of the receipt of 
child pornography at a maximum of twenty years, plus one count of 
child pornography possession at a maximum of ten years ([(24 x 30 
years) + (1 x 20 years) + (1 x 10 years)] = 750 years).162 Then in United 
States v. Weiss, the judge sentenced the individual to a total of 845 years 
 
 156 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2 n.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
 157 See id. 
 158 United States v. Poole, 451 F. App’x 298, 300 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 159 See Press Release, U.S. Drug Enf’t Admin., supra note 148. 
 160 See Hanna v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96274, at *1 (D.S.C. July 12, 2012). 
 161 United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 162 Id. at 823 n.2. 
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in prison with a series of concurrent and consecutive sentences of five to 
twenty years each for seventy-eight counts of conviction.163 
The application of mandatory minimum statutes on at least one 
count was common, though not universal. At least one count triggering 
a mandatory minimum was evident in 80% of the cases. Two types of 
mandatory minimum offenses predominated in this dataset. One of 
these involved a conviction for child pornography production, which 
carries a mandatory minimum of fifteen years for first-time offenders,164 
and was present in nineteen out of the fifty-five cases. The other 
prevalent statute explaining many extreme sentences is of the hybrid 
variety, requiring multiple, consecutive, and mandatory minimum 
sentencing. This latter one implicates the statutory provision of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), a law that criminalizes carrying a firearm during a crime 
of violence or drug trafficking offense.165 
In simple terms, § 924(c) liability requires conviction on a 
predicate offense involving either violence or drug trafficking. With a 
qualifying predicate offense, § 924(c) provides for additional 
punishment if a firearm was involved. Section 924(c) sentencing is 
sufficiently harsh and contested frequently enough that it is distinctly 
known in federal sentencing circles by its numerical statutory number. 
An individual’s first § 924(c) conviction triggers a five to thirty-year 
sentence depending upon the type of weapon and how it was used.166 
Subsequent § 924(c) convictions carry a mandatory minimum of at least 
twenty-five years.167 In addition, each § 924(c) sentence must be served 
consecutively by statutory mandate.168 Indeed, to ensure that a 
sentencing judge does not attempt to ameliorate the harsh consequences 
of the law, the statute explicitly states that a court may not avoid these 
mandatory minimums by imposing a probationary sentence, or by 
ordering that a § 924(c) minimum mandatory sentence be served 
concurrently with some other sentence, including the punishment 
meted out for the predicate violent or drug offense.169 
A contested issue in the law at one time involved whether § 924(c) 
consecutive sentencing for subsequent offenses applied at all when 
multiple predicate offenses involving firearms are charged in the same 
indictment or prosecuted in the same trial. The Supreme Court has 
 
 163 See Clary, supra note 152. 
 164 See 18. U.S.C. § 2251(e) (2012). 
 165 Another statute requiring consecutive, mandatory minimums in the data was 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A, requiring consecutive sentences of two years for each aggravated identify theft 
conviction. Section 1028A increased the sentence in United States v. Thompson by a relatively 
small degree. United States v. Thompson, 523 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 2008).  
 166 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (B)(ii). 
 167 § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). 
 168 § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). 
 169 §§ 924(c)(1)(D)(i), (ii). 
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resolved the answer in the affirmative.170 Section 924(c) can further 
increase sentences substantially in multi-defendant trials as liability 
extends to co-conspirators and aiders and abettors of the predicate 
offenses involving drugs or violence.171 A recent congressional report 
acknowledges that the practical effect of § 924(c) can mean a prison 
term equivalent to life imprisonment.172 
The exceptional impact of this particular gun enhancement law was 
observable in this study. Almost half of the extreme sentences were 
subject to § 924(c) mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences. As a 
representation of its ratchet effect, one defendant’s 215-year term was 
computed as thirty years concurrent for the predicate offenses, plus 
consecutive sentences of ten years for the first § 924(c) offense, and 
twenty-five years for each of the seven subsequent § 924(c) convictions, 
for a total sentence of 215 years ([(1 x 30 years) + (1 x 10 years) + (7 x 25 
years)] = 215 years).173 
Statutorily required mandatory minimums and mandated 
consecutive sentencing drove up the penalty scales in most cases in this 
dataset, yet do not explain all of the extreme punishments. In 20% of the 
cases, neither type applied. In other words, in these eleven cases 
comprising the 20%, no statute required any sentence of imprisonment. 
Without a required statutory prison term, and considering that federal 
sentencing guidelines are now discretionary, the judge in those cases 
legally could have sentenced the defendant to probation or a fine only if 
the judge believed a nonprison sentence to be a reasonable penalty. Of 
these eleven cases not involving mandatory minimums, six were 
convicted of some form of financial fraud, three for drugs, and two for 
child sexual exploitation crimes (not involving child pornography 
production). 
In sum, the term of any single mandatory minimum offense was 
never by itself sufficient to explain these extreme sentences. Instead, in a 
significant minority of cases, mandatory consecutive sentencing under 
§ 924(c) were nondiscretionary drivers. In the remainder of the cases, 
the discretionary use of consecutive sentencing for multiple crimes was 
the cause. From a theoretical perspective, the imposition of consecutive 
penalties is consistent with Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy, 
mentioned earlier, of punishing for “every part of the mischief” and for 
every offense the individual committed.174 In these cases, an additional 
 
 170 See Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993). 
 171 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41412, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM 
SENTENCING: THE 18 U.S.C. 924(C) TACK-ON IN CASES INVOLVING DRUGS OR VIOLENCE 11 
(2013). 
 172 Id. at 11 nn.73 & 77 
 173 See United States v. Chapman, 551 F. App’x 850, 852 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 174 BENTHAM, supra note 16, at 20. 
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harm was evidently counted for almost every single crime of conviction 
and for the presence of a weapon in certain crimes of violence or drug 
trafficking. 
After conducting a qualitative review of relevant discursive 
materials concerning the cases in this dataset, it is apparent that the 
explanations for these extreme sentences can also largely be accounted 
for in the pragmatic, philosophical, and moral judgments of the judges 
and prosecutors who advocated for such penalties and the reporters who 
publicize them. Descriptions of these judgments follow. 
 
2.     Perpetual Incapacitation 
In passing down these extreme prison sentences, judges often 
clearly expressed that their intention was for these defendants to be 
permanently imprisoned. These sentiments confirm the two 
expectations that the philosophical theory of punishment regarding 
incapacitation and that an exclusionist mindset would be represented in 
at least some of the extreme sentence materials. For example, a judge 
granted the prosecutor’s request for a 235-year sentence in one case to 
ensure that the armed robbery felon “will now be incarcerated for the 
rest of his life.”175 Similarly, an appellate court approved a sentence of 
290 years to ensure the child pornography defendant “remains 
incarcerated for life.”176 A judge in another case in issuing a sentence of 
over 700 years for armed robbery indicated he felt there was a need “to 
take you out of society.” 177 
Prosecutors have literally cheered these sentences as practically and 
symbolically representing life in prison. In a press release to announce 
sentences of 750 years and 1,590 years for two codefendants, a 
prosecutor professed, “I applaud the sentences handed down today, as 
the [defendants] will spend the rest of their natural lives behind prison 
bars.”178 Another U.S. attorney in his press release reporting on a 245-
year sentence for a repeat child molester affirmed that it meant the 
 
 175 Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Smith, No. 07-735 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 14, 2009). 
 176 United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 536 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 177 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., “Old Navy Crew” Robbers 
Sentenced to Hundreds of Years in Prison (Mar. 25, 2010), https://www.fbi.gov/sacramento/
press-releases/2010/sc032510.htm. The judge also indicated that “I am going to do my utmost 
to make certain that neither of you ever spends another free day for the rest of your lives.” John 
Ellis, Robbery Spree Nets Long Jail Terms, FRESNO BEE (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:27 PM), http://
www.fresnobee.com/news/local/crime/article19504149.html#!. 
 178 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120. 
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offender is “guaranteed to spend the rest of his life in prison.”179 Such an 
exclusionist mentality is similarly represented in another case when a 
federal prosecutor announced a sentence of 325 years for child 
pornography production because “[c]hild predators have no place in 
society except in a federal prison.”180 
Several sentencing judges appeared to make it personal by 
indicating their express intentions to eternally exclude the defendants 
from civil society. In a financial fraud case with one of the highest 
sentences ever issued, the judge contextualized the penalty as signifying 
that the defendant “should be removed permanently from society.”181 A 
judge in another case in issuing a sentence of over 700 years for armed 
robbery indicated he felt there was a need “to take you out of society 
because you are not civilized.”182 Similarly, a sentencing judge in 
declaring a 235-year penalty expressed to the individual defendant that 
“[t]his sentence, Mr. Metzger, make no mistake, is designed so that you 
will be in [prison] for the rest of your life.”183 
In some cases, the lengths of the prison terms were nods to the 
expected wishes of direct and indirect victims for their offenders’ 
banishment. A prosecutor in commenting on a lengthy sentence in a 
murder-for-inheritance scheme, sympathized that “[w]e hope that the 
family, friends, and community will sleep a little better tonight knowing 
that the person who committed these horrific crimes will remain in 
prison.”184 A judge in a separate case issued sentences of 300 years and 
 
 179 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Mo., Kansas City Man Sentenced 
to 245 Years for Drugging 13 Children, Videotaping Molestations (Nov. 6, 2012), https://
archives.fbi.gov/archives/kansascity/press-releases/2012/kansas-city-man-sentenced-to-245-
years-for-drugging-13-children-videotaping-molestations; see also James Queally, Amish Girls’ 
Kidnappers to Spend Their Lives in Prison, Officials Say, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2015, 2:11 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-amish-kidnappings-plea-20150514-
story.html (quoting prosecutor in case of sentences of 300 years plus for codefendants as stating 
they would “spend their lives in federal prison”). 
 180 Leesburg Man Gets 325-Year Sentence, GADSDEN TIMES (Jan. 17, 2008, 12:13 AM), http://
www.gadsdentimes.com/lifestyle/20080117/leesburg-man-gets-325-year-sentence. 
 181 Clary, supra note 152. 
 182 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., supra note 177 . The judge 
also indicated that “I am going to do my utmost to make certain that neither of you ever spends 
another free day for the rest of your lives.” Ellis, supra note 177. 
 183 United States v. Metzger, 411 F. App’x 1, 3 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Judge Metes Out 200 
Years for Rape, THELEDGER.COM (Jan. 28, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.theledger.com/article/
20060128/NEWS/601280400 (noting judge in issuing a 200-year sentence asserted that “I hope 
that he never sees the light of day again”); Stephanie Taylor, Woman in Child Porn Case 
Sentenced to 450 Years, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (July 1, 2009, 3:30 AM), http://
www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20090701/NEWS/906309939 (noting judge in issuing a 450 
year sentence declared that “I don’t think that you’ll ever be released from prison”). 
 184 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of S.C., Former Florence County 
Deputy Sentenced to 400 Years’ Imprisonment (June 4, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
columbia/press-releases/2010/co060410.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
the S. Dist. of Ind., Hogsett Announces 115-Year Sentence for Evansville Man Guilty of 
Production, Distribution of Child Pornography (May 31, 2012), https://archives.fbi.gov/
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more for codefendants convicted of sex crimes against children after 
one of the victims wrote a letter to the judge asking for a penalty that 
would “[i]solate them for life.”185 
Several judges and prosecutors invoked incapacitation specifically 
by underscoring that the extraordinary sentences would preclude the 
defendants’ ability to recidivate by committing similar crimes. A 
prosecutor in publicly commenting on a 280-year sentence for Barbara 
Lang, the female operator of a pill mill involving painkillers, stated, 
“[s]he will never be able to participate in the illegal distribution of 
prescription drugs again.”186 This type of perpetual preventive detention 
rationale particularly resonated in cases involving child sexual 
exploitation.187 Prosecutors in several cases declared that centuries-long 
terms meant that the defendants can “never again be able to prey on 
innocent children,”188 “never victimize another child for the rest of his 
life,”189 and “never be able to abduct, drug and sexually abuse children 
again.”190 
In sum, then, the purpose of complete incapacitation and an 
exclusionist mindset were strong in the discourses regarding these cases. 
An obvious related question, and the subject of another hypothesis, is 
whether participants and observers understood that sentences of 200 
years and more were, for all practical purposes, equivalent to technical 
life sentences in a system with no parole. 
 
archives/indianapolis/press-releases/2012/hogsett-announces-115-year-sentence-for-evansville-
man-guilty-of-production-distribution-of-child-pornography (sentencing judge commented 
“[a]lthough these horrible acts can never be undone, today we can at least say with certainty 
that this man will never walk the streets of Evansville again”). 
 185 Tim Nudd, Couple Get 880 Years in Jail for Kidnapping and Abusing Amish Girls in 
Upstate New York, PEOPLE (Dec. 18, 2015, 11:15 PM), http://www.people.com/article/couple-
sentenced-880-years-amish-girls-kidnapping-abuse. 
 186 ‘Aunt Bea’ Gets 280-Year Federal Prison Term for Operating Pill Mill, TIMES FREE PRESS 
(Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2015/aug/29/aunt-bea-gets-
280-year-federal-pristerm-opera/322391 (referring to defendant as “grandma”). 
 187 E.g., Montevallo Man Sentenced for Producing Child Porn, SHELBY COUNTY REP. (Dec. 9, 
2008, 5:25 PM), http://www.shelbycountyreporter.com/2008/12/09/montevallo-man-
sentenced-for-producing-child-porn (quoting prosecutor: “May the light of day be denied to 
anyone who would abuse a child in this manner.”). 
 188 Laura Lane, Bloomington Man Sentenced to 315 Years for Child Pornography, HERALD-
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011, 12:19 AM), http://ww.heraldtimesonline.com/stories/2011/11/22/
news.qp-0403609.sto. 
 189 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Mo., supra note 179. 
 190 Nudd, supra note 185; see also Man Sentenced to 235 Years for Making Child Porn, RTV 6 
ABC (May 17, 2010, 11:18 AM), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/man-sentenced-to-235-
years-for-making-child-porn (noting prosecutor’s comment that the “incapacitating sentence” 
prevents defendant from victimizing more children). 
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3.     Virtual Life 
Curiously, neither federal law nor the Sentencing Guidelines 
provide for a numerical time equivalent in terms of months or years for 
a life-without-parole sentence.191 While the Sentencing Commission has 
used 470 months as the numerical proxy for a LWOP penalty in its 
statistical databases, it does so for convenience in order to statistically 
adjudge average sentences.192 In policy and practice, then, federal law 
and the Guidelines treat any length of a prison sentence as a lesser 
penalty than a technical LWOP sentence.193 Thus, a sentence of, say, 400 
years, could be treated as guideline-compliant even though by the 
relevant statute(s), the count(s) of conviction precluded a LWOP 
sentence.194 
A couple of defendants challenged this treatment of any term of 
imprisonment as legally constituting a lesser sentence than LWOP. In 
the case of a white-collar offender, the defendant argued that since a 
guidelines-based sentence suggested a LWOP sentence, the judge’s 
“translation” of the life recommendation to a 330-year term was 
improper.195 The appellate court disagreed, admitting that as none of the 
offenses of conviction statutorily permitted a LWOP sentence, the 
sentencer could not have issued such a formal life sentence.196 At the 
same time, the appellate court determined that a guideline-computed 
sentence recommended life imprisonment and, therefore, a sentence 
that was functionally equivalent to LWOP was still proper.197 A similar 
argument was made in another case involving a child pornography 
defendant in which it was argued that the 750-year prison term 
unlawfully counted as greater than a technical life sentence.198 The 
appellate court there also denied the claim, indicating that while a 
LWOP sentence was not statutorily permitted, one that was functionally 
 
 191 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2012) (stating a guideline recommended range of 30 years or 
more means the maximum is life, thus signifying LWOP is the maximum possible prison 
sentence); United States v. Christensen, 582 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 192 See CHRISTINE KITCHENS, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING DATA AND 
ANALYSIS ISSUES 3 (2010). 
 193 See United States v. Eckstrom, 626 F. App’x 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 194 See, e.g., United States v. Grigsby, 749 F.3d 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting statutory 
maximum of 260 years is less than life); see also United States v. Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 574 (4th 
Cir. 2014) (noting that “because none of Cobler’s criminal charges provided for a sentence of 
life imprisonment, Cobler’s guidelines sentence ultimately was calculated to be 1,440 months, 
or 120 years, which represented the sum of the statutory maximum sentences available for each 
count of conviction”). 
 195 See United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 196 See id. 
 197 See id. 
 198 See United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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equivalent to life in prison was still an option and one it found to be 
reasonable.199 
Even though statutory law and the guidelines treat LWOP 
sentences as the most severe penalty available in the federal system 
(outside capital punishment), judges often realized that these centuries 
plus terms were practically equivalent to LWOP sentences.200 A couple 
of opinions in cases involving extreme sentences reiterated that 
“because [the defendant’s] life expectancy is but a fraction of his 
sentence . . . . a sentence of such length is, for ‘practical purposes . . . a 
life sentence, and that’s how we view it.’”201 An additional judge was 
forthright in his analogy: “Although [the defendant’s] argument that his 
sentence is just too much has some intuitive appeal, no qualitative 
difference exists between a sentence of hundreds of years and a life 
sentence.”202 Several prosecutors, too, translated these extreme prison 
terms as representing an equivalent proxy for an otherwise technical 
LWOP sentence.203 
Often, media reporters clearly understood that these extreme 
sentences practically meant life in prison as well.204 Reporters described 
several of the extreme sentences in this dataset as “lifetime federal 
prison terms,”205 “effectively a life sentence,”206 or “tantamount to 
life.”207 Regarding another case, the news article implied such a result, 
 
 199 See id. 
 200 E.g., Lewis, 594 F.3d at 1275; see also United States v. McNeal, 364 F. App’x 214, 217 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (calling a 290 year sentence “effectively a life sentence”); United States v. Thompson, 
523 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The district court thought a life sentence was warranted, 
and it did not err when it imposed consecutive maximum sentences on each count of 
conviction to reach an equivalent sentence.”); Vasiloff v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
171054, at *14, (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2013) (commenting that a sentence of 325 years “is basically 
just another way of saying life”). 
 201 United States v. Poole, 451 F. App’x 298, 309 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Betcher, 534 F.3d at 
827–28). 
 202 United States v. Metzger, 411 F. App’x 1, 3 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 203 See Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Smith, No. 07-735 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 14, 2009) (prosecutor’s memorandum indicating a sentence of 235 years is an 
“effective life sentence”); Morton, Child Abuser Gets 480 Years, supra note 124 (quoting 
prosecutor describing a sentence of 480 years as “essentially a life without parole sentence”). 
 204 E.g., Lane, supra note 188 (indicating child pornography defendant with a 315 year 
penalty, had “been sentenced to spend the rest of his life in jail”); Reputed Drug Lord Gets Life 
in Prison: The Engineer of a $2-Billion Cocaine Empire is Sentenced to 205 Years for Corrupting 
a 1996 Trial, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 23, 2003), http://www.sptimes.com/2003/01/23/State/
Reputed_drug_lord_get.shtml (indicating 205 year sentence was “life in prison”). 
 205 Judge Imposes Lifetime Prison Terms in Amish Kidnapping Case, NBC NEWS (Dec. 17, 
2015, 8:45 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-imposes-lifetime-prison-terms-
amish-kidnapping-case-n482161. 
 206 Kim, supra note 130. 
 207 Bruce Tomaso, ‘Scarecrow Bandit’ is Sentenced to 330 Years, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 
19, 2010, 5:20 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/
20100219-Scarecrow-Bandit-is-sentenced-8782.ece. 
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indicating that the defendant “was sentenced to 11,520 months—960 
years—in federal prison without the possibility of parole.”208 
At times, reports were sarcastic in tone regarding the apparent 
hypocrisy of extreme prison terms.209 A primary example of this 
concerns the case of Norman Schmidt, a prominent figure in white-
collar sentencing in recent times.210 According to a 2008 news report, a 
“federal judge sentenced 72-year-old Norman Schmidt last week to a 
mind-bending 330-year prison sentence after he was found guilty last 
May of a laundry list of conspiracy and fraud charges. Barring a 
scientific breakthrough in cryogenic technology, Schmidt will spend the 
rest of his days behind bars.”211 In the same case of Norman Schmidt, a 
popular sentencing law and policy blogger responded, obviously 
tongue-in-cheek, commenting that “with 15 percent good-time credit, 
Schmidt may be able to get out as early as the year 2289.”212 These latter 
examples remain consistent with the hypothesis that the discourses 
regarding the extreme sentences would conceptualize them as virtual life 
terms. 
4.     General Deterrence 
It was hypothesized that, in addition to relying upon the need for 
perpetual incapacitation through penalties that represent virtual life 
sentences, the relevant discourses would cite the value of general 
deterrence. As expected, many of the judges in these cases expressly 
invoked general deterrence in their sentencing opinions.213 At its 
philosophical core, general deterrence justifies punishing one individual 
as a signal to others that they face painful consequences, too, if they 
violate similar norms that civil society holds dear. This rationale 
explains the government’s position when it argued that a 235-year 
 
 208 Jason Morton, Child Porn Gets Man 960 Years: Videotapes Made by Vernon Man Were 
‘Malicious, Sadistic’, TUSCALOOSA NEWS (Apr. 26, 2008, 3:30 AM) [hereinafter Morton, Child 
Porn Gets Man 960 Years], http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20080426/NEWS/37624528. 
 209 See also infra text accompanying notes 301–03(similar criticisms by appellate courts and 
judges of extreme sentences). 
 210 See American Greed: Money for Nothing: Fraud in Paradise (CNBC television broadcast 
Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100000540. 
 211 Luke Mullins, A White-Collar Sentence of 330 Years: Fraudster Gets an Apparently 
Unprecedented Term, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 7, 2008, 11:06 AM), http://
money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-collar/2008/05/07/a-white-collar-sentence-of-330-years. 
 212 Id. 
 213 E.g., United States v. Okun, 453 F. App’x 364, 373–74 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1278 (10th Cir. 2010); Falgout v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
97491, at *25 n.4 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2013). 
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sentence was needed in an armed robbery case to “deter all others who 
would commit similar offenses.”214 
Criminal justice officials often distinctly invoked the general 
deterrence purpose of a particular extreme sentence by utilizing the 
terminology of sending a “message,”215 though usually also invoking 
some additional emphasis. Thus, in announcing a prison term involving 
hundreds of years, prosecutors at times publicly proclaimed that the 
sheer enormity of the sentence should send a “powerful message,”216 a 
“clear message” to others that they will be held accountable,217 or that, 
regarding a 315-year penalty for a child pornography producer, “today’s 
sentence sends a strong message that child sexual exploitation will be 
punished severely.”218 Notably, prosecutors and other governmental 
agencies often issued press releases in these cases to specifically 
publicize the sentences issued.219 Press releases containing detailed 
information about the crimes committed and the penalties issued as a 
result certainly represent a nod to the communicative function of 
general deterrence by putting the public on notice of the potentially 
severe consequences for violating federal criminal laws. 
Similarly, another frequent refrain was that lengthy prison 
sentences were meant to serve as a “warning” to other would-be 
criminals.220 For example, a local article reported that “[a]uthorities 
portrayed the stiff sentence as a warning to anyone involved in child 
pornography.”221 In the same case, a special agent with Homeland 
Security proclaimed that “[t]his sentence should serve as a sobering 
 
 214 Government’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Smith, No. 07-735 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 14, 2009). 
 215 E.g., Kansas Man Gets 260 Years for Producing Child Porn, KSNT.COM (May 20, 2013, 
2:59 PM), http://ksnt.com/2013/05/20/kansas-man-gets-260-years-for-producing-child-porn/
?iframe=true&preview=true. 
 216 Morton, Child Abuser Gets 480 Years, supra note 124. 
 217 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Indiana Child Pornography Producer Sentenced 
to 235 Years in Prison (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Indiana Child 
Pornography Producer Sentenced to 235 Years]; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Middle Dist. of Fla., Former Teacher Sentenced to 210 Years for Sexually Exploiting 
Children (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/jacksonville/news/press-
releases/former-teacher-sentenced-to-210-years-for-sexually-exploiting-children (citing FBI 
agent lauding a 210-year sentence to send “clear message to others involved in this horrendous 
crime that exploits the most innocent among us”). 
 218 Lane, supra note 188; see also Kim, supra note 130 (noting judge’s intent in “sending a 
message to any American who would consider traveling abroad to have sex with children”). 
 219 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of Fla., supra note 217; 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120; Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., Ex-Marine Receives 210-Year Prison Term, supra note 131. 
 220 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Ex-Marine Receives 210-Year Prison Term, supra note 131 
(noting prosecutor’s statement that “[t]his lengthy sentence should serve as a stern warning to 
other pedophiles”); Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., supra note 177. 
 221 Leesburg Man Gets 325-Year Sentence, supra note 180. 
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warning to every sexual predator who thinks they can hide from the law 
by violating the innocence of children overseas.”222 
Extreme prison terms were highlighted specifically in certain child 
pornography cases to publicly represent domestic law enforcement’s 
intent to pursue and prosecute cases involving child sexual exploitation 
offenses more generally.223 Thus, in several cases involving child 
pornography production, prosecutors in their press releases stressed the 
extreme sentences as symbolizing the federal government’s continued 
and marked interest in pursuing these types of offenders in order to 
reduce child sexual exploitation offending.224 
5.     Retributive Ideologies 
Unexpectedly, considering the extraordinary nature of 200-year 
sentences, retributive rationales were not as salient in the discourses. 
Still, retribution as a point was present in two cases. In a case involving 
child molestation, the prosecutor suggested the retributive “eye-for-an-
eye” ideology, stating that the defendant “impacted a child’s life forever, 
and the federal judicial system has returned the favor.”225 In a broader 
context, a prosecutor contended that the 205-year sentence given to a 
drug money launderer who had successfully bribed a juror to acquit him 
in a previous trial would “send an unmistakable message that justice in 
our court cannot be bought.”226 
6.     Dehumanizing Characterizations 
An earlier focus of this Article oriented toward some unique 
ideological mindsets that serve to justify virtual life penalties.227 An 
exclusionist mentality may instrumentally justify the permanent 
 
 222 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Ex-Marine Receives 210-Year Prison Term, supra note 131. 
 223 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120 
(prosecutor stating: “Children must be protected from sexual exploitation, and we remain 
committed to prosecuting child pornography cases. I thank the FBI for its diligent work on this 
disturbing case.”). 
 224 E.g., Lane, supra note 188 (noting prosecutor’s statement: “No prison term can undo the 
pain and suffering Mr. Bostic has caused, but today’s sentence sends a strong message that child 
sexual exploitation will be punished severely.”); A Federal ‘Hammer’ for Producers of Child 
Porn, PIONEER PRESS (Dec. 17, 2007, 11:01 PM), http://www.twincities.com/2007/12/17/a-
federal-hammer-for-producers-of-child-porn (noting then Attorney General highlighting 
exemplary penalty of 750 years for child pornography production at the National Project Safe 
Childhood Conference). 
 225 Leesburg Man Gets 325-Year Sentence, supra note 180. 
 226 Reputed Drug Lord Gets Life in Prison: The Engineer of a $2-Billion Cocaine Empire is 
Sentenced to 205 Years for Corrupting a 1996 Trial, supra note 204. 
 227 See discussion supra Sections I.D., I.E. 
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consignment of individuals to the bowels of prison. It was expected that 
an exclusionist mindset underlying virtual life sentences would also 
engage dehumanization processes. For many of these extreme 
sentencing cases, commentators referenced the sheer barbarity of the 
offenders’ crimes to substantiate the isolating consequences.228 The term 
“heinous” to describe the crimes was often used,229 as had been the 
relatively synonymous adjectives of “atrocious”230 and “horrific.”231 
Government officials also in some cases described the criminal actions 
in some of these extreme sentencing cases in terms indicating that they 
invoked physically repulsive responses, such as being “disturbing, 
inexcusable and sickening,”232 “abhorrent,”233 or the “most egregious 
and despicable.”234 
Another frequent dehumanizing tactic in justifying extreme 
sentences that practically and symbolically banished individuals from 
civil society to die inside prison was to orient them as somehow other 
than normal human beings entitled to respect. Thus, molesters of 
children to produce child pornography were described as “scumbag[s]” 
in one case,235 and in another a “sicko couple” for a girlfriend/boyfriend 
pair.236 Several armed robbers were characterized in broader terms as 
representing domestic terrorists.237 
Even more distinctly dehumanization practices were confirmed 
and notable. Descriptive devices drew upon themes that several of these 
defendants were deficient in engaging basic human morality, such as 
 
 228 E.g., Falgout v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *25 n. 4 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 
2013) (referencing crimes as “unspeakable”); Lane, supra note 188. 
 229 E.g., United States v. Grigsby, 749 F.3d 908, 909 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014); Kim, supra note 
130; Morton, Child Porn Gets Man 960 Years, supra note 208; Jeff Weiner, Child Pornographer 
Matthew Graziotti Gets 210-Year Sentence, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://
www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-matthew-graziotti-child-predator-
sentencing-20150126-story.html. 
 230 Taylor, supra note 183. 
 231 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of S.C., supra note 184; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of Ind., supra note 184 (using the term 
“horrible”). 
 232 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120. 
 233 Id. 
 234 United States v. Graziotti, 619 F. App’x 980, 981 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 235 Sarah Fenske, Leland Beasley: Sentenced to 290 Years in Child Porn Case, RIVERFRONT 
TIMES (July 5, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2011/07/05/leland-
beasley-sentenced-to-290-years-in-child-porn-case. 
 236 Sicko Couple who Sexually Abused Amish Girls Get Centuries Behind Bars, supra note 
123.  
 237 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., supra note 177; Press 
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Va., Chesapeake Man Sentenced to 221 Years 
in Prison for Bank Robberies and Related Firearms Charges (July 6, 2010), https://
archives.fbi.gov/archives/norfolk/press-releases/2010/nf070610.htm.  
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being labeled “morally depraved,”238 “morally reprehensible,”239 “not 
civilized,”240 and having no “bounds of decency.”241 Defendants were at 
times also described as lacking human empathy, including having no 
“mercy on their victims”242 or acting with “extreme indifference and 
cruelty to his victims.”243 A news article about codefendants convicted of 
sexual crimes against children referred to them as representing the 
“basest among us,”244 thus implying subhuman character. In several 
cases, the defendants or their crimes were described as “monstrous,”245 
which certainly connotes evil, but subhuman actors. Similarly, the 
prosecutor in a white-collar case justified the penalty by describing the 
defendant in demonic terms as an “evil” being who “steals souls.”246 
Characterizations of repeat child molesters at times drew upon the 
infrahumanization technique involving animalistic imageries of 
uncontrolled predators seeking to satisfy their own selfish sexual 
satisfaction without regard to the rights or health of their vulnerable 
victims.247 Another animal-like reference included several depictions of 
child pornography defendants in terms of their “prey[ing]” on 
vulnerable children,248 with “prey” being a uniquely focused term that 
 
 238 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of Ohio, Cincinnati Man Sentenced 
to 240 Years in Prison for Producing Child Pornography (May 13, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/
contact-us/field-offices/cincinnati/news/press-releases/cincinnati-man-sentenced-to-240-years-
in-prison-for-producing-child-pornography.  
 239 Falgout v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *25 n.4 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 
2013). 
 240 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., supra note 177. The judge 
also stated “I am going to do my utmost to make certain that neither of you ever spends 
another free day for the rest of your lives.” Ellis, supra note 177. 
 241 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Cal., supra note 177. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Falgout, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *25 n.4 (referencing further to his “abject 
cruelty”). 
 244 Sicko Couple who Sexually Abused Amish Girls Get Centuries Behind Bars, supra note 
123. 
 245 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of N.Y., Stephen Howells and Nicole 
Vaisey Sentenced for Child Exploitation (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-
offices/albany/news/press-releases/stephen-howells-and-nicole-vaisey-sentenced-for-child-
exploitation; see also Nudd, supra note 185 (noting prosecutor’s indicating sentence a 
“reflection of the monstrous crimes committed by [the defendants] against the most vulnerable 
amongst us—our children”); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Ex-Marine Receives 210-Year Prison 
Term, supra note 131 (“Monstrous does not begin to capture the horror of the crime or the 
impact on the victims.”). 
 246 Clary, supra note 152. 
 247 E.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of Fla., supra note 217; 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of Mo., supra note 179; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the S. Dist. of Ohio, supra note 238 (declaring defendant “an 
active and enthusiastic participant in a community of morally depraved individuals who trade 
child sex abuse images and videos to satisfy their sexual desires”). 
 248 E.g., Falgout, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *25 n.4 ; Christin Nance Lazerus, Lake 
Station Man Gets Life for Photographing Abuse, Sharing it, CHI. TRIB.: POST-TRIB. (May 12, 
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usually depicts blood-thirsty carnivores in the animal world. Similarly, a 
defendant was reported to have “used his own son as bait” to lure other 
young children over for sleepovers in order to victimize them.249 Thus, 
the prediction that discourses would embrace dehumanization and 
infrahumanization in the form of animal imagery was supported in this 
study. Considering the extreme sentences in this dataset regarded prison 
terms of 200 years and more, the next topic to consider involves the 
hypotheses regarding issues with numbers. 
E.     Normalizing Extreme Penalties 
It was hypothesized that this set of extreme sentences would 
provide indications of anchoring bias, scale distortions, and other 
troubles with numbers. Of course, it was not possible to directly test the 
cognitive processes of judges with respect to these psychological 
constructs. Still, the data collected and studied provide relevant insights. 
It was clear that a consequence was to normalize extreme prison 
sentences. 
1.     Anchors 
The expectation that sentencing guidelines would act as anchors 
can be answered succinctly and positively. It was clear across cases that 
the sentencing guideline recommendations acted as reliable anchors for 
almost all of the severe sentences. The vast majority of cases were 
compliant with guidelines’ recommended ranges. Indeed, in about half 
of the cases, the resulting sentence was set precisely at the recommended 
minimum term. 
2.     Scaling and Magnitude 
At face value, a system subject to comparative analysis, which is 
based on a numerical set with equal distances, appears to be easily 
ranked. For example, people probably generally understand the 
difference between pursuing a community college degree, generally 
taking two years, and a college degree at four years, is a difference of two 
years; or, that it will generally take half the time for the community 
college degree. One might likewise presume that sentences involving 
 
2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-eckstrom-
child-porn-st-0513-20150513-story.html; Weiner, supra note 229.  
 249 Weiner, supra note 229. 
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prison terms would represent a linear, additive model in which 
punishment is finely scaled to the offending behavior.250 Yet, this study 
of extreme penalties highlighted several problems with scaling and the 
magnitude of these punishments. 
In several cases, observers who attempted to provide a descriptive 
adjective to the resulting sentence did so in vague, though stark terms. A 
court referred to a 745-year plus penalty for armed robberies simply as 
“harsh.”251 Similarly, an official depicting sentences of over 750 years 
and 1,500 years for a husband and wife team, respectively, described 
both merely as “stern.”252 In a different case also involving a 750-year 
sentence for child pornography a court termed it “extraordinary,”253 
while a reporter regarding the same case deemed it a “federal 
hammer.”254 Utilizing similar object imagery, a reporter commenting on 
a 218-year sentence indicated the defendant “sure got hit with a 
whopper of a sentence.”255 
There is evidence from case law suggesting the effects of both 
scaling and magnitude in terms of the normalization of virtual life 
sentences in the first place. Then the increasing magnitude of the 
accepted scale of the lengths of prison sentences served to “up the ante,” 
so to speak. This normalization effect resonated from the sentences 
within the dataset presented herein on other cases both within and 
without this dataset. The 310-year sentence given in United States v. 
Lewis that is part of the dataset has specifically influenced the upward 
scaling of sentences in white-collar fraud cases. In upholding a forty-
five-year term for financial fraud, an appellate court cited the 310-year 
term as “imposing a comparably stiff sentence for a fraudulent scheme 
of this magnitude.”256 Similarly, in another case, the court stated that the 
100-year sentence given that defendant for a Ponzi scheme “is in line 
with sentences imposed in similar white-collar cases,” such as the 310-
year sentence in Lewis.257 
The presence of some of these extreme sentences represent a 
magnitude scaling effect whereby penalties that might otherwise be 
viewed as unreasonably harsh pale in comparison. In a case of three 
 
 250 See Bettina von Helversen & Jörg Rieskamp, Predicting Sentencing for Low-Level Crimes: 
Comparing Models of Human Judgment, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 375, 379 
(2009). 
 251 United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 812 (9th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Bostic, 
491 F. App'x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting 315-year sentence “extremely stiff”). 
 252 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120. 
 253 Dan Heilman, Recent Sentence in U.S. District Court Highlights Seriousness of Child-Porn 
Charges, MINN. LAW. (May 21, 2007). 
 254 A Federal ‘Hammer’ for Producers of Child Porn, supra note 224. 
 255 Norfolk Judge Gives Man 218 Years for Drugs, Guns, HIGHBEAM RES. (Dec. 4, 2004), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-125837940.html. 
 256 United States v. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330, 344 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 257 United States v. Okun, 453 F. App’x 364, 374 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011). 
HAMILTON.38.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  4:44 PM 
108 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:59 
 
codefendants convicted for a series of armed robberies, a news reporter 
wrote that one of them who received a sentence of 112 years in prison 
“got off easy” as his codefendants received 149- and 386-year 
sentences.258 This perspective seems odd considering none of these 
defendants can possibly survive to complete their terms. 
Normalization of long prison terms was strongly evident in cases 
involving child sexual exploitation offenses. Several cases in the extreme 
sentencing database directly influenced the acceptability of prison terms 
at various lengths and thus provided anchors themselves. The 235-year 
sentence in United States v. Metzger has been an influential anchor in 
normalizing sentences in other cases of 27 years,259 120 years,260 even 
150 years.261 Similarly, the 290-year term given in the child pornography 
production case of United States v. Beasley has directly impacted 
judgments made by other judges. Citing the Beasley penalty, courts 
approved sentences of fifty years262 and sixty years.263 The 750-year 
sentence in a child pornography production case that is part of the 
extreme sentence dataset has also had a scaling effect. Referring to it, 
another court indicated that the 110-year penalty issued in that case, 
while “lengthy, it is not unprecedented.”264 
Some jurists in making these comparisons are presented with 
issues in comprehending significant differences (both in terms of 
percentage and sheer number of decades) that various sentence lengths 
entail. As an illustration, in an opinion rejecting the claim that a sixty-
year sentence for child sexual abuse offenses was unreasonable, the 
appellate panel wrote that the penalty was not unfair considering the 
“similarly severe sentences” for like offenses, referring as examples to 
prison terms of 40 years, 100 years, and 750 years.265 Reviewing these 
numbers, though, it does not appear clear that they are “similarly 
severe.” The sixty-year sentence approved is 150% of the forty-year 
sentence cited, while representing just 60% and 8% of the higher two of 
100 years and 750 years, respectively. In another case, an appellate court 
affirmed a 100-year sentence for child pornography production because 
other courts had already approved lengthy sentences in such cases, 
 
 258 Rafael Olmeda, 3 Sentences: 112 to 386 Years, SUN SENTINEL (July 14, 2009), http://
articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-07-14/news/0907130415_1_hollywood-7-eleven-federal-jury-
robbery. 
 259 See United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 842 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 260 See United States v. Demeyer, 665 F.3d 1374, 1375 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 261 See United States v. Olmeda, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170420, at *14–15 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 
2014). 
 262 See United States v. Ratigan, 581 F. App’x 587, 591–92 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 263 See United States v. Smith, 795 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing Beasley and Betcher 
in affirming sixty-year sentence). 
 264 United States v. Stong, 773 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 265 United States v. Goergen, 683 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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referring to prison terms issued in six cases, which actually ranged 
widely from 35 years to 750 years.266 These cases signify cognitive scale 
distortions. 
Problems of scaling distortion because of the presence of these 
extreme sentences were likewise present in additional cases. Two cases 
upheld sentences of almost 30 years and of 120 years in part because of 
preexisting penalties between 80 and 750 years.267 A sentence of 150 
years was upheld because “numerous courts” have affirmed sentences of 
100 years and more for similar offenses.268 Likewise, in the case of 
United States v. Graziotti, the court’s approval as reasonable a sentence 
of 210 years, which it conceded was “clearly longer than the defendant’s 
remaining life expectancy,” was due in part to the existence of other 
cases affirming sentences of 100 years, 140 years, and 750 years.269 
The 750-year sentence mentioned in several of the foregoing cases 
is from United States v. Betcher,270 a case that is part of the dataset. This 
particularly extraordinarily long sentence has come to represent a 
significant magnitude effect, drawing up the length of many other 
sentences. To the court in United States v. Beasley, for instance, the 
seven plus centuries penalty helped it approve an extreme 290-year 
sentence to its defendant.271 It is not as if the Betcher appeals panel did 
not understand the rationality-challenged nature of such a penalty. It 
expressly commented about the “absurdity of a 750 year sentence, or 
even a 10,000 year sentence,” but then immediately contextualized that 
it “should not detract from the gravity of [the defendant’s] crimes.”272 
This phrasing and the magnitude reframing sentiment it reflects has 
been positively repeated in other court opinions affirming lengthy 
sentences.273 The magnitude adjustment caused by Betcher’s 750-year 
sentence reflects another ramification related to scale distortion that was 
observed, though it was not one of the original hypotheses. The 
exploratory analysis of the discourses revealed a consequence of 
lengthening prison terms, which will be referred to as a ratchet. 
 
 266 See United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1221 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 267 See United States v. Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 580 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Nania, 724 
F.3d 824, 842 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 268 United States v. Olmeda, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170420, at *14–15 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 
2014). 
 269 United States v. Graziotti, 619 F. App’x 980, 981 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 270 534 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 271 United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 536 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 272 Betcher, 534 F.3d at 828. 
 273 E.g., Graziotti, 619 F. App’x at 981; United States v. Smith, 795 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 
2015) (sixty-year sentence); United States v. Stong, 773 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2014) (110-year 
sentence); United States v. Demeyer, 665 F.3d 1374, 1375 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (120-year 
sentence). 
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3.     The Ratchet Effect 
Normalization and magnitude scaling indicated a ratchet effect in 
many cases in which actors push the length of sentences even further 
into the abyss of time, often for seemingly symbolic reasons. Public 
documents concerning these severe sentences indicated a preference in 
some instances for one-upmanship. Some of the observers appeared to 
be enamored with either offenses or penalties that represent the worst of 
the worst. Judges in several of the cases involving child pornography 
production case described the offenders as representing the most 
despicable offenders in their experience.274 The sentencing judge in one 
case indicated that it merited the “dubious distinction” of being one of 
the worst cases to be heard in his district.275 In another child 
pornography case, the judge commented that “I have been on the bench 
since 1998, and this is the worst case I have personally dealt with, 
including murders.”276 Similarly, a separate jurist commented that it was 
“the single-most disturbing case that I’ve had in 12 or 13 years as a 
judge.”277 
Prosecutors in a few cases also highlighted that the sentences were 
justified as the child pornography codefendants were “among the most 
dangerous offenders ever prosecuted by this office”278 and in another 
case that the offending was “the most horrific in the state,”279 and 
thereby deserved some of the longest sentences ever issued. 
A few commentators were enticed by potentially record sentence 
lengths, too. A news report of a 750-year sentence for child pornography 
production blatantly referred to it as the “longest on record.”280 A 
reporter indicated that a sentence of 315 years for child pornography, 
was “one of the longest prison terms ever handed down in the U.S. 
Attorney Office for the southern district of Indiana.”281 Along the same 
lines, a news report announced that a sentence of 309 years constituted a 
“record,” representing the longest white-collar sentence in the district 
 
 274 See United States v. Falgout, 325 F. App’x 775, 779 (11th Cir. 2009); Weiner, supra note 
229 (noting judge’s commenting case the most heinous he’d ever seen). 
 275 Morton, Child Porn Gets Man 960 Years, supra note 208. 
 276 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the N. Dist. of Ala., supra note 120. 
 277 United States v. Eckstrom, 626 F. App’x 640, 642 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 278 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Indiana Man Sentenced to 315 Years in Prison for 
Producing and Trafficking Child Pornography (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
indiana-man-sentenced-315-years-prison-producing-and-trafficking-child-pornography. 
 279 Morton, Child Porn Gets Man 960 Years, supra note 208. 
 280 Pamela Jean, Child Pornography Producer Receives 750-Year Sentence, Longest on Record, 
DIGITAL J. (May 10, 2007), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/179791. It was actually not the 
longest on record, even in the federal system, as prior to that Sholam Weiss received an 845-
year term. See Weiss v. Yates, 2008 WL 5235162, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2008). 
 281 Lane, supra note 188. 
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while being the fourth longest white-collar sentence in American 
history.282 Similarly, a press release by the district’s prosecutor proudly 
announced in its headline concerning a sentence issued in 2011 of 290 
years for child pornography charges that it was the “Largest Sentence 
Ever Imposed in the Eastern District of Missouri.”283 
Of course, a danger to the ratchet effect is to encourage further 
sentencing creep into the oblivion of time. One can wonder whether the 
10,000-year sentence posited by the Betcher court is merely allegorical or 
if it was prescient. In any event, it was predicted that the extreme 
sentences would represent additional issues with numerosity. 
4.     Numerosity 
In the federal guidelines system, prison sentence recommendations 
(with the exception of those specifically recommending life in the form 
of a technical LWOP sentence) are meted out in units of months. Thus, 
the guidelines provide for calculations based upon the recommended 
number of months of imprisonment. As a result, the culture of issuing 
sentences using a scale of months is imbedded in practice even when 
judges vary from the guidelines’ recommendation. In the database of 
extreme sentences provided herein, in every case (with a single 
exception) the formal months-long designated sentence was at some 
point, though, translated by some reporting source into a higher metric. 
This means that across all cases, either the relevant sentencing decision, 
appellate opinion, prosecutorial press release, and/or news report 
retooled the months-based formal penalty to a presumably more 
understandable measurement. Toward the higher end, a reporter 
indicated that a sentence, which totaled 11,520 months, amounted to 
“almost a millennium behind bars.”284 Several other reports depicted 
sentences as representing “centuries” of imprisonment.285 Still, across 
 
 282 See Record 309-Year Sentence Upheld for White-Collar Criminal, 
BATONROUGECRIME.COM (Mar. 30, 2011), http://ww.batonrougecrime.com/2011/03/baton-
rouge-crime-news/record-309-year-sentence-upheld-for-white-collar-criminal.  
 283 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of Mo., Local Man Sentenced to 290 
Years in Prison on Federal Child Pornography Charges: This is the Largest Sentence Ever 
Imposed in the Eastern District of Missouri (July 5, 2011), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/
stlouis/press-releases/2011/local-man-sentenced-to-290-years-in-prison-on-federal-child-
pornography-charges. 
 284 Morton, Child Porn Gets Man 960 Years, supra note 208. 
 285 E.g., Sicko Couple who Sexually Abused Amish Girls Get Centuries Behind Bars, supra 
note 123; Nathan Gorenstein, “Mandatory Minimum” Laws Can Mean Grossly Disparate 
Sentences for Gun Crimes, PHILLY.COM (Feb. 7, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-02-07/
news/31034299_1_federal-prison-mandatory-minimum-laws-mandatory-prison-terms; 
Tammie Toler, Former Drug Kingpin Sentenced to 2 Centuries, BLUEFIELD DAILY TELEGRAPH 
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cases the most prevalent measurement was to report the long sentences 
in terms of the number of years involved.286 The implication of the 
tendency to translate sentences of 2,400 months and more is that at such 
a high number we may have trouble cognitively processing what it 
means in those terms. Instead, the practice of reframing the formal 
months-long penalties into higher scales, such as years or centuries, 
suggests doing so provides us with a more relatable measurement, even 
though it is clear that none of these defendants can actually complete 
their sentences. 
Interestingly, in most of the cases in the dataset, the number of 
months of the sentence were evenly divisible by twelve without a 
remainder, which, obviously, translates into whole years.287 Thus, in 
terms of the psychological draw of clean numbers, the judges in extreme 
sentence cases seemed to pay more attention to the number per annum 
than the number of months, despite the requirement of computing in 
months-based guideline ranges. Overall, 70% of the cases represent 
these whole-year types of sentences. Further, the vast majority of these 
whole-year terms were set at either five- or ten-year intervals—such as 
325 years or 750 years. The frequency of translating these extreme 
sentences into clean and more understandable years-long terms suggest 
troubles with scaling and the extraordinariness of the sheer magnitude 
of the length of these prison sentences. 
In sum, the data collected confirm the occurrence of these extreme 
sentences engaging in, and causing, anchoring effects and scaling 
distortions. Issues with numerosity resulted in many instances of 
translating months-based numbers into a more relatable metric, usually 
the number of years. In addition, judges in most cases simply rounded 
to whole years, often at the five- and ten-year intervals. When 
proportionality in penalties is a strong foundational concern, it would 
also be expected that defendants who receive these extreme prison terms 
would face incentives to challenge their legality. 
 
(Oct. 26, 2007), http://www.bdtonline.com/archives/former-drug-kingpin-sentenced-to-
centuries/article_d9313f1d-fafc-53ac-b771-e01743c1bc8b.html. 
 286 E.g., United States v. Huff, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162776, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2014); 
Matthew Dolan, Judge Criticizes Prison Term: Ex-City Officer Sentenced to Mandatory 315 
Years for Gun Crimes, Robbing Drug Dealers, HIGHBEAM RES. (June 17, 2006), https://
www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-147152204.html. 
 287 See supra Table 1. 
HAMILTON.38.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  4:44 PM 
2016] E X T R E M E  P RI S O N  S E N T E N C E S  113 
 
F.     Legal Challenges to Extreme Sentencing 
A significant majority of the defendants receiving extreme 
sentences have appealed them.288 Notably, though, none of the fifty-five 
cases in the dataset of federal defendants sentenced to prison terms of at 
least 200 years have as of yet been successful in overturning their 
punishments on constitutional grounds or as being unreasonably 
excessive in violation of federal sentencing statutes. Nonetheless, it will 
be noted that proportionality in at least a few cases remains questionable 
considering their circumstances. 
1.     Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
In a 2012 law review article, Professor Michael Mannheimer 
highlighted the case of a fifty-five-year sentence issued to a federal 
defendant convicted of three counts of possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of a felony drug trafficking crime (§ 924(c)) after selling 
marijuana to an informant.289 Evidently, this length of a sentence caused 
an uproar at the time. “An extraordinary coalition of 163 individuals 
consisting of former United States District and Circuit Judges, former 
United States Attorneys, and even four former Attorneys General of the 
United States, filed a brief amicus curiae, arguing that the sentence 
constituted ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”290 Even though the sentencing judge called the fifty-five 
year penalty (which was required by mandatory minimum laws) “cruel, 
unjust, and irrational,”291 he issued the statutorily required sentence 
anyway, and it was affirmed on appeal.292 
Despite the collection of prominent and outspoken critics of the 
fifty-five-year sentence in that case, none of the defendants receiving 
prison terms of 200 years and more have enjoyed a similar outcry. 
Further, none of them to date has convinced an appellate court of the 
unjustness of their sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds. As the 
appellate court in a case of a sentence of 300 years for armed robberies 
 
 288 E.g., United States v. Ross, 582 F. App’x 528 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); United States v. 
Major, 676 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2010). 
More defendants are likely to appeal their sentences in the future. At the time of this writing, 
several defendants had recently been assigned their penalties and, therefore, there was 
insufficient time for them yet to have perfected their appeals. 
 289 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 69, 71 (2012). 
 290 Id. 
 291 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004), aff’d, 433 F.3d 738 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
 292 See United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006). 
HAMILTON.38.1.2 (Do Not Delete) 11/4/2016  4:44 PM 
114 C ARD O Z O  L A W R E V IE W  [Vol. 38:59 
 
noted, a successful challenge to any sentence based on its length will be 
“rare.”293 Another court was even more skeptical, noting that the 
Supreme Court had never ruled that any term of years in prison 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.294 
Consistent with the foregoing observations on the improbability of 
finding any non-life prison sentence to be unconstitutional, appellate 
courts responding to Eighth Amendment challenges to these extreme 
sentences have generally rejected them summarily.295 The explanations 
have been rather simple. Some courts simply cited precedents upholding 
sentences of fifty years and more.296 Thus, the potential effects from 
anchors and magnitude scaling seem to have impacted appellate judges 
as well. Courts have also rejected constitutional claims on these extreme 
sentences, despite acknowledging that in practical terms they constitute 
life sentences.297 
The courts in these cases that have issued opinions have also rather 
quickly spurned constitutional objections to mandatory minimums that 
drove many of these extreme sentences. The courts generally deferred to 
congressional intent, such as when Congress establishes mandatory 
minimums to reflect their vision of the seriousness of the offending,298 
even when having mandated consecutive sentencing in the case of 
§ 924(c) cases.299 Another court also rejected a challenge to mandatory 
minimums where prior courts have generally upheld such laws, even 
though they may not permit individualized sentencing.300 
2.     Reasonableness Challenges 
Nonetheless, at least a few judges, practitioners, and commentators 
have called out these extreme sentences for their inanity. A judge, in 
dissenting to sentences of about 750 years each for codefendants, 
chastised the majority: “No known human being has the capacity to live 
 
 293 United States v. Smith, 609 F. App’x 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 294 See United States v. McNeal, 364 F. App’x 214, 217 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 295 E.g., United States v. Lewis, 433 F. App’x 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (rejecting 
Eighth Amendment challenge without further comment); United States v. Falgout, 325 F. App’x 
775, 779 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (declining defendant’s conclusory argument).  
 296 United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Wiley, 132 F. 
App’x 635, 643 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 297 E.g., United States v. Eckstrom, 626 F. App’x 640, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2015); McNeal, 364 F. 
App’x at 217; Vasiloff v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171054, at *50–51 (N.D. Ala., 
Aug. 14, 2013). 
 298 United States v. King, 270 F. App’x 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Vasiloff, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171054, at *50–51. 
 299 See United States v. Smith, 609 F. App’x 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 300 See United States v. Huff, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162776, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 
2014). 
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700 years. No living human being is likely to live 700 years. On its face, 
the sentence is impossible to execute.”301 This dissenting judge further 
complained that the government was asking that the court “affirm a 
sentence that cannot be carried out. I do not believe that we should 
participate in this utterly empty gesture.”302 An appellate court in a 
different case noted the “absurdity of a 750 year sentence, or even a 
10,000 year sentence,” but affirmed it anyway because of the heinous 
nature of the defendant’s crimes.303 
Of course, defense counselors are likely candidates to highlight the 
sheer extravagance of these penalties. They have complained that 
sentences of 200 years or more are “absolutely crazy”304 or “physically 
impossible to serve.”305 Another defense lawyer lamented that “common 
sense has been breached.”306 In similar terms, a journalist in reporting 
on a 330-year sentence referred to it as of “mind-bending” magnitude.307 
Yet, again, despite some questions concerning the rationality of 
these sentences, none of the defendants have as yet been successful in 
getting a favorable ruling on reasonableness grounds. Two appeals 
courts approved extreme sentences while conceding that they are 
impossible to complete.308 Some appellate courts, in affirming these 
extreme sentences, despite reasonableness challenges, referred to their 
appropriately reflecting within-guidelines ranges, and thus enjoying a 
presumption of reasonableness.309 This legal presumption can be viewed 
in psychological terms as a formal confirmation of anchoring effects in 
which the guidelines’ recommendation are deemed legally cognizable 
anchors. Finally, in another opinion, the appellate court quipped, in an 
oddly pun-like way, that the defendant “contends that a 235-year 
 
 301 United States v. Major, 676 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2012) (Noonan, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 302 Id. 
 303 United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2008). The phrase has been quoted 
in other opinions upholding sixty and over sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Smith 795 F.3d 
868, 872 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); United States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 536 (8th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Demeyer, 665 F.3d 1374, 1375 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
 304 ‘Aunt Bea’ Gets 280-Year Federal Prison Term for Operating Pill Mill, supra note 186 
(calling defendant “grandma”). 
 305 United States v. Graziotti, 619 F. App’x 980, 981 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
 306 Jeff German, Man Sentenced to 237 Years for Robbery Spree, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (May 24, 
2012, 11:05 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/man-sentenced-237-years-
robbery-spree. 
 307 Mullins, supra note 211. 
 308 See Graziotti, 619 F. App’x at 981; United States v. Poole, 451 F. App’x 298, 309 (4th Cir. 
2011). 
 309 See e.g., United States v. Ross, 582 F. App’x 528, 530 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); United 
States v. Beasley, 688 F.3d 523, 536 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Falgout, 325 F. App’x 775, 
777 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
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sentence, which is ‘just shy of eight times greater than necessary to cause 
[his] statistically likely death in prison,’ is overkill.”310 
3.     Enduring Proportionality Concerns 
Despite the failure of any of the extreme sentence defendants to get 
their sentences overturned on grounds of unfairness (to date), it is not 
evident that these penalties are proportional in all cases. Many of the 
study’s subjects committed heinous acts of violence where severe 
punishment may be seen as appropriate. Several of the defendants were 
found at sentencing to have been involved with a homicide and 
penalized on that ground, even if their convictions did not formally 
include murder charges.311 Gary Eugene Chapman was convicted of 
charges related to retaliatory gang-related murders involving the Vice 
Lords, a major Chicago street gang.312 In the other cases, the federal 
convictions were for offenses other than homicide, likely because of a 
lack of jurisdiction in federal court. Still, these defendants’ purported 
involvement in a murder was still relevant to the punishment at 
sentencing.313 For example, two of the defendants were convicted on 
mail and wire fraud charges. The cases were not related, but each was 
actually sentenced for the relevant conduct of murdering a relative and 
trying to profit from the decedent’s life insurance proceeds.314 
The cases involving child pornography production are typically 
tragic cases in that they often entail the contact offenses involving sexual 
molestation of children. The three male-female couples convicted on 
federal child pornography production charges mentioned briefly 
involved multiple acts of child molestation by them against multiple 
young kids. But not all of the child pornography cases appear to be the 
worst of the worst from a comparative perspective, which would seem to 
be required for a proportionality of penalty analysis considering the 
extreme sentences issued. As an example, Bruce W. Betcher was 
sentenced to 750 years.315 His crimes entailed surreptitiously taking 
pornographic and erotic photographs of his two granddaughters and 
 
 310 United States v. Metzger, 411 F. App’x 1, at *3 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 311 These include Timothy Poole, Darry Hanna, Jarvis Ross, Jamail James Hogan, Maurice 
Gibson, and Gary Chapman. 
 312 See Carley Gordon, Violent Gang Members Convicted, WMSV.COM (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:22 
PM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/15329030/violent-gang-members-convicted. 
 313 The federal sentencing system permits a defendant to be punished for any “relevant 
conduct.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011). 
 314 See United States v. Hanna, 353 F. App’x 806 (4th Cir. 2009); Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Dist. of S.C., supra note 184. 
 315 See United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2008). 
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their three friends aged eight to eleven.316 Yet there appears to be no 
evidence, not even any allegation by authorities, that he or anybody else 
touched any of them in a sexual way or that the girls engaged in any 
sexualized conduct.317 Case facts suggest the girls were largely oblivious 
to his actions. Similarly, Gary Steven Vasiloff’s sentence of 325 years was 
for taking pornographic images of his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter.318 
Even the sentencing judge conceded there was no allegation he had 
touched the girl, though he had given her beer and taught her how to 
use a dildo on herself while he took the photographs.319 
Then, Roderick McNeal, instead of appearing to embody the 
epitome of violent criminals, seems more to represent a potentially 
garden-variety, though prolific, armed robber. Roderick McNeal robbed 
eleven fast food restaurants and three gas stations in Texas and 
Louisiana over a three-week period.320 Acting alone, he would enter, 
demand employees give him the bills from cash registers, and then 
flee.321 In total, his crimes are estimated to have netted him a total of 
about $3,000.322 His sentence was 290 years.323 
Not all the bank robbers seemed to represent the most heinous of 
violent offenders, either. Jason Montes and Margarito Armijo 
committed multiple bank robberies over a several month period around 
the state of Texas.324 Yet the pair’s criminal behavior does not seem to 
rise to any particularly heinous level to justify their almost 400-year 
terms. Indeed, as the court described their basic modus operandi, their 
tactics seemed minimally risky to the health of others considering how 
dangerous some bank robbers may be—such as those who shoot their 
victims or take hostages. The court outlined the codefendants’ usual 
routine:  
[They] drove to the target location in a stolen, four-door Honda 
Accord; ran into the bank wearing dark clothes, gloves, and ski 
masks and carrying guns; demanded money from the tellers and put 
it in a large, dark-colored duffel bag; and exited the bank within one 
minute of entering. They drove off in the Accord and left the car—
still running, with at least one of the doors open—within a mile of 
the bank and had someone pick them up, usually in a white Ford 
Expedition, to continue their escape.325 
 
 316 See id.  
 317 See id. 
 318 See Vasiloff v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171054, at *3 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
 319 See id. at *16–17. 
 320 See United States v. McNeal, 364 F. App’x 214 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 321 See id. at 215. 
 322 See id. 
 323 Id. 
 324 See United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 325 Id. 
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The scenario sounds like a typical bank robbery that presumably the 
guidelines already cover in the bank robbery offense characteristics in 
adjudging a final offense level. For Montes and Armijo, their criminal 
history was insufficient to account for their extreme penalties. Montes 
had a minor criminal background (Criminal History II for a guidelines 
calculation) while Armijo was a first offender. 
For some of the fraud defendants, even though they may have 
bilked people out of a lot of money, there is no evidence of violence, 
drugs, or other type of incredible harm to the physical welfare of 
victims. Sholam Weiss and Keith Pound drained assets out of an 
insurance company they owned and defrauded insurance regulators.326 
Pound was a first-time offender. Then there was the 309-year sentence 
handed to Robert Thompson.327 His crime? Identify theft.328 The FBI’s 
own press release recounts what is presumably their grimmest view of 
the facts. 
The matter involved Thompson engaging in multiple conspiracies 
with numerous co-conspirators to obtain and use the personal and 
financial information of more than 61 individuals, churches, 
financial institutions and businesses, without their knowledge or 
authorization, to steal from their bank accounts, and use their credit 
to obtain things of value, including attempting to steal $20,000,000 
from one victim’s bank accounts. To facilitate the scheme, among 
other things, Thompson bribed a corrections officer at Elyan Hunt 
Correctional Center $10,000 to provide Thompson with cell phones 
while an inmate at the facility.329 
For identify theft, Thompson received what was then reported as the 
fourth longest white-collar sentence in U.S. history and the longest in 
the history of the Middle District of Louisiana.330 
Finally, the last example of a seemingly disproportionate penalty to 
be addressed regards Barbara Lang, a.k.a. Aunt Bea. Her story is where 
this Article began. Yes, she operated a pill mill where prescription 
medications were inappropriately made available to drug abusers.331 Yes, 
she was greedy in her motive.332 But if greed itself in this capitalistic 
society is sufficient to distinguish her as monstrous and to justify a 
 
 326 See Clary, supra note 152. 
 327 See United States v. Thompson, 417 F. App’x 429, 430 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 328 See id. 
 329 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of La., White Collar Defendant 
Sentenced to 309 Years in Prison (Feb. 17, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/neworleans/
press-releases/2010/no021710.htm. 
 330 Record 309-Year Sentence Upheld for White-Collar Criminal, supra note 282, see also U.S. 
Attorney’s Office for the Middle Dist. of La., supra note 329. 
 331 See United States v. Lang, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184310, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. July 10, 2014). 
 332 See id. at *2–3. 
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sentence of 280 years, then the notion of proportionality as a general 
goal appears to hold no boundaries. 
CONCLUSION 
This study focused on extreme sentences of at least 200 years issued 
in the federal criminal justice system. The import of these sentences is 
that while they do not constitute technical life sentences, in reality they 
act as life sentences since the penalties cannot possibly be fully executed 
in a system without parole and with strictly limited good time. 
The hypotheses that preceded the mixed method study were 
generally supported. The discourses concerning the extreme sentences 
in the database justified them using the traditional theories of 
deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, though the latter theory was 
uncommon. Sentencing judges and appellate courts approved the 
penalties as proportional to the offenses and offenders, though usually 
in summary terms. The discourses appropriately conceptualized these 
sentences as being equivalent to life sentences. An exclusionist mentality 
that also drew upon dehumanization practices and imagery resonated in 
much of the discourses.  
The expectation that the cognitive biases presented by anchoring 
and scaling effects was supported. The sentencing guidelines’ 
recommended range and lengthy sentences issued in comparable cases 
suggested obvious anchors that appeared to influence normalizing 
extreme prison sentences. Scaling effects presented in the form of 
translating sentences from a guidelines-based scale of months into years, 
presumably to better cognitively map their degree. Rounding prison 
terms to whole years and the common use of numbers ending in five 
and ten suggest the judges who issued them were punishing based on 
their general feeling for the cases and for the symbolic value of such 
sentences. A ratchet effect was also observed in that many judges 
explained that the presence of these extreme sentences supported even 
longer prison terms in other cases. 
The study results are concerning for a few reasons. As these 
defendants have had no success to date in convincing courts of the 
unreasonableness of their penalties, more sentences in this range and 
increasingly longer sentences are likely in the future. The normalization 
of extreme sentences and the ratchet effect may have just begun. The 
most extreme 1,590-year sentence issued just recently in 2015 is 
evidence for those prophecies. Plus, sentences of at least 200 years were 
issued to nonviolent and first-time offenders, suggesting 
disproportionality. Traditional sentencing philosophers would likely call 
these extreme sentences tyrannical, constituting a significant threat to a 
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foundational principle for just sentencing. In the end, the continued 
support for extraordinarily lengthy prison sentences challenges the hope 
that America’s penchant for imprisonment has waned in all respects. 
Still, hopefully this study adds to our knowledge about some of the 
consequences of the policies that underscored mass incarceration. 
 
